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What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the
community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools
is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it destroys our democracy.1
— John Dewey

INTRODUCTION
The United States stands at a crossroads regarding educational equity. On one road, the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA),2 the current reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), greatly reduced federal involvement in education and returned control to state and local governments that had repeatedly criticized the prescriptive nature
of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.3 In the wake of this
federal retreat, state and local control of education without effective federal oversight creates grave concerns for those who advocate for economically disadvantaged and minority students,

1. THE SAGUARO SEMINAR: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AM., HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T, CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP 36 (2015) [hereinafter
CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP] (quoting John Dewey, The School and Social
Progress, in THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1907)).
2. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
3. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-100, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002). For a critique of ESSA that contends that the federal government has
essentially abandoned its role in education, see Derek W. Black, Abandoning
the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1340–61 (2017).
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including many civil rights groups.4 History confirms that states
and localities have repeatedly neglected the needs of these students and provided them inferior educational opportunities.5
On the other road stands a national commitment to equity.
Federal education law and policy has long included equity as one
of its chief aims.6 The principle of equal opportunity is a shared
ideal that has transcended ideological and partisan divisions
throughout U.S. history.7 New evidence of a national commitment to equity can be found in a statement issued after state
education chiefs gathered in 2017 under the leadership of the
Council of Chief State School Officers and the Aspen Institute in
which state chiefs committed to a set of recommendations regarding equity.8 Some skeptics might dismiss this statement as
mere political posturing.9 However, it is worth remembering that
the states and a handful of professional associations initiated the
standards and accountability reform movement that all states
eventually embraced.10 After a 1989 summit of the nation’s governors in Charlottesville, Virginia, the governors released a
statement that supported national performance goals that would
4. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Obama Signs into Law a Rewrite of
No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/11/us/politics/president-obama-signs-into-law-a-rewrite-of-no-child
-left-behind.html.
5. Chad Aldeman, The Case Against ESSA: A Very Limited Law, in THE
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR SCHOOLS, SYSTEMS AND
STATES 91, 92 (Frederick M. Hess & Max Eden eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT].
6. Charles Barone & Elizabeth DeBray, Education Policy in Congress: Perspectives from Inside and Out, in CARROTS, STICKS, AND THE BULLY PULPIT:
LESSONS FROM A HALF-CENTURY OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS 61, 63 (Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly eds., 2011).
7. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 8.
8. See THE ASPEN INST. EDUC. & SOC’Y PROGRAM & THE COUNCIL OF
CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, LEADING FOR EQUITY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE
EDUCATION CHIEFS (2017), https://ccsso.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/Leading
%20for%20Equity_011618.pdf (highlighting commitments state chiefs can implement to create equity plans); Daarel Burnette II, State Chiefs at Conference
Tout Equity Policies in ESSA Plans, EDUC. WK.: POL. K–12, (Feb. 16, 2018, 5:52
PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2018/02/state_chiefs_tout_
equity_policies_in_essa_plans.html. Work on the recommendations preceded
the 2016 election and represents the work of not only state chiefs but also district leaders and civil rights advocates. Alyson Klein, See How States Plan to
Approach Equity, EDUC. WK.: POL. K–12, (Feb. 2, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://blogs
.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/02/states_plan_approach_equity_
ESSA.html.
9. See Burnette II, supra note 8 (reporting civil rights and advocacy groups
skepticism of state implementation of ESSA plans).
10. See infra note 11.
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increase U.S. competitiveness.11 Federal legislation in the form
of the Improving America’s School Act and No Child Left Behind
built on what began merely as a widespread expression of state
support.12 Furthermore, history teaches us that state and local
experiments that spread horizontally often become embedded in
federal policy.13
Indeed, despite its reduction in the federal role in education,
the bipartisan ESSA retains equity as one of its goals. ESSA’s
purpose emphasizes this equity aim in noting that the law seeks
“to provide all children significant opportunity to receive a fair,
equitable, and high-quality education, and to close educational
achievement gaps.”14 ESSA also requires states and districts to
measure and close achievement gaps.15 Districts must intervene
in the lowest performing schools as well as when subgroups of
students are underperforming.16 In fact, congressional Democrats insisted that equity requirements be included in ESSA to
garner their support for the bill.17
Equity concerns also undergird the numerous recent teacher
strikes that have occurred throughout the country. Teachers undoubtedly want increases in their salaries in light of falling
teacher pay during the recent recession.18 Yet, many of the
strikes also seek to address the lackluster funding of schools in
many states, particularly the reduction in funding since the 2008
recession.19 Although nationally, combined state and local funding in actual dollars returned to pre-recession levels by 2016,

11. DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID
FEDERAL REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 124 (2009); PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, at 60–63 (2006).
12. COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 11, at 9–11.
13. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 10.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2016).
15. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B), 6311(c)(4)(A).
16. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(D), 6311(d)(2)(A)–(B).
17. Alyson Klein, How ESSA Passed: The Inside Scoop, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 43, 54–57.
18. See Robert Gebeloff, The Numbers That Explain Why Teachers Are in
Revolt, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 6, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/06/04/
upshot/school-funding-still-lags-after-recession-ended.html (discussing how education spending cuts have decreased teacher salaries).
19. See Moria Ballingit, Arizona Teachers, Among the Nation’s Lowest Paid,
Threaten to Strike, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2018), https://washingtonpost.com/
news/education/wp/2018/03/29/arizona-teachers-among-the-nations-lowest
-paid-threaten-to-strike/?utm_term=.5e00650ad401 (noting that Arizona teachers were demanding a raise and restoration of school funding to pre-recession
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school funding has shifted slightly to a greater reliance on local
funding, which raises concerns regarding equity because of the
disparities in funding based on local property taxes.20 In addition, numerous states are funding schools well below pre-recession levels, with Florida and Arizona providing approximately
23% less funding, and Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma spending more than 10% less on education.21 Teachers are experiencing the effects of less funding, both
in their lower salaries as well as in the physical condition of their
schools.22
The passage of ESSA and these events raise a critical question regarding how ESSA will impact educational equity: does
ESSA allow states to use their new flexibility to stay on the welltrodden road that leaves disadvantaged and minority students
behind,23 or will ESSA help to guide states in advancing equity
levels); Dana Goldstein, Teachers in Oklahoma and Kentucky Walk Out: ‘It Really Is a Wildfire’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/
teacher-strikes-oklahoma-kentucky.html (“Thousands of teachers in Oklahoma
and Kentucky walked off the job Monday morning, shutting down school districts as they protested cuts in pay, benefits and school funding in a movement
that has spread rapidly since igniting in West Virginia this year.”); Anita Snow
& Terry Tang, Arizona Teachers End Walkout After Governor Signs Off on 20
Percent Raise, CHI. TRIB. (May 3, 2018), http://chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/ct-arizona-teacher-protests-20180503-story.html (quoting the
President of the Arizona Education Association regarding the need for continued campaigning from teachers for additional funding despite their increase in
salary); Kalia White et al., ‘Tired of Begging’: Teacher Rebellion Shuts Down
Oklahoma, Kentucky Schools, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2018), https://usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2018/04/02/teacher-strikes-shut-down-schools-across
-oklahoma-kentucky/478102002 (noting that teachers were striking in Oklahoma to restore over $100 million in school funding that had been cut over the
last ten years despite a pay raise).
20. Michael Leachman, New Census Data Show Persistent State School
Funding Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (May 22,
2018, 2:15 PM), https://cbpp.org/blog/new-census-data-show-persistent-state
-school-funding-cuts.
21. See id.
22. See Gebeloff, supra note 18 (explaining the ramifications of education
spending cuts, including teacher layoffs); Josephine Sedgwick, 25-Year-Old
Textbooks and Holes in the Ceilings: Inside America’s Public Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/04/16/reader-center/us-public
-schools-conditions.html (summarizing teachers’ descriptions of the poor conditions in their schools, including such comments as “[t]here are holes in the ceiling, skylights don’t work, the walls need to be painted” and “I had six laptops
for 42 fifth-grade students (in one classroom) with many broken keys and
chargers”).
23. See Cynthia G. Brown, From ESEA to ESSA: Progress or Regress?, in
THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 153, 164 (arguing that
ESSA does not support disadvantaged students).
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for all students? Congress undeniably succeeded in designing
ESSA to reduce federal involvement in education.24 This Article
examines whether Congress also effectively designed ESSA to
advance its equity goals as well as how Congress can reauthorize
the law to more effectively advance equity. It engages with the
ongoing scholarly debate about the potential impact of ESSA on
equity in which some argue that ESSA can and should be used
as a vehicle to advance equity and innovation,25 while others express great skepticism about ESSA’s ability to promote equity.26
To begin to answer if ESSA will effectively promote equity,
I must first define equity. Equity in education requires educational opportunities to be distributed based on students’ needs
rather than their race, national origin, zip code, or parental income levels.27 Our nation’s diverse students need a fair allocation of opportunities and resources tailored to students’
strengths, challenges, and vulnerabilities. Equity recognizes and
responds to these differences rather than administers a one-size24. See Black, supra note 3, at 1340–61; Michael Heise, From No Child Left
Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to a Future for Education Federalism,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1859, 1872–75 (2017) (describing the limitations placed on
the federal government by ESSA).
25. CHANNA M. COOK-HARVEY ET AL., LEARNING POL’Y INST., EQUITY AND
ESSA: LEVERAGING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY THROUGH THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT v (2016) (“[T]he recent passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act . . . represents an opportunity for the federal government, states, districts, and schools to equitably design education systems to ensure that the
students who have historically been underserved by these same education systems receive an education that prepares them for the demands of the 21st century.”); Martin R. West, The Case for ESSA: A Proper Balance, in THE EVERY
STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 75, 76 (“Far from a retreat from the
federal government’s long-standing commitment to support America’s most vulnerable children, ESSA represents a new vision for fulfilling that commitment
in light of the capacity and resources at its disposal.”).
26. See Aldeman, supra note 5, at 91, 96 (“Under ESSA, states have the
option to identify only the absolute bottom 5 percent of schools receiving federal
funds, leaving the remaining 95 percent of schools without any pressure to improve.”); Black, supra note 3, at 1346–57 (contending that ESSA does not effectively require equality in inputs or outputs); Brown, supra note 23, at 153, 164
(“While ESSA offers some improvements, it’s mostly a missed opportunity. It’s
weak on the training/assigning of quality teachers, . . . and financing public
schools equitably nationwide.”).
27. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA
1 (2010) (noting that educational opportunities in this nation “too often depend
on where students live, on how much money their parents earn, or the color of
their skin”); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING INEQUITY IN AN ERA OF INCREASING CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY AND RESEGREGATION 10 (2018) (recommending “that the federal government must take bold action” to combat educational funding inequities in the United States).
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fits-all model.28 It grants additional resources to the students
with the greatest disadvantages and aims for differences in outcomes to be based on ability.29 Equity also seeks excellence in the
educational opportunities for all children, rather than accepting
a leveling down to reduce disparities. Although I primarily use
equity to encompass this definition, I also use the phrase “equal
opportunity” as synonymous with equity.
Equity has been and should remain a national priority in
education for many reasons. Equity provides one of the primary
historical and modern justifications for federal involvement in
education.30 The last half-century reveals that Congress intervenes to advance equity when a constituency within U.S. society
has been denied equal educational opportunity and when the
states and districts show either an unwillingness or an inability
to address these inequities.31
Research confirms that today many economically disadvantaged and minority students too often receive less funding, inferior teachers, less rigorous courses, and fewer resources, to name
a few of the disparities.32 These opportunity gaps undermine the

28. See Janice Petrovich, The Shifting Terrain of Educational Policy: Why
We Must Bring Equity Back, in BRINGING EQUITY BACK: RESEARCH FOR A NEW
ERA IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 3, 4 (Janice Petrovich & Amy Stuart
Wells eds., 2005) (discussing the differences between equity-based reforms and
excellence-based reforms). Thus, I am explicitly rejecting the definition of equity
that provides all students with the exact same resources. See BENJAMIN M. SUPERFINE, EQUALITY IN EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY, 1954–2010, at 25 (2013)
(noting that equity can be defined to include all students receiving the same
resources and as all students being given the resources needed to achieve the
same outcome).
29. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 51.
30. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 25, 31, 33–34 (noting historical and
modern examples of federal intervention to advance equity in education); Barone & DeBray, supra note 6, at 61, 63 (highlighting increased congressional involvement in education to address denials of equal educational opportunity).
31. Barone & DeBray, supra note 6, at 61, 63.
32. See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAW CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING
FAIR?: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 9 (7th ed. 2018) (showing funding gaps for
high-poverty districts); IVY MORGAN & ARY AMERIKANER, THE EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2018: AN ANALYSIS OF FUNDING EQUITY ACROSS THE U.S. AND WITHIN
EACH STATE 6, 10 (2018) (finding funding gaps for low-income and minority students); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5, 9–10 (confirming
lower funding and inferior opportunities for poor and minority schoolchildren);
Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take
to Close the Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD AN EVEN CHANCE 77, 84–87 (Prudence L.
Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013) [hereinafter CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY
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ability of many poor and minority students to be prepared for
colleges and careers.33 This longstanding inequitable distribution of high-quality educational resources is undermining successful academic outcomes for poor and minority children.34 The
National Assessment for Education Progress (NAEP), also
known as the Nation’s Report Card, provides a comparison of
students across the United States, in contrast to state tests that
vary between states in rigor and cut scores. This data confirms
the “very large” racial achievement gap and the even larger socioeconomic achievement gap.35 These gaps, on average, constitute approximately one and a half years of schooling.36
Longstanding opportunity and achievement gaps along lines
of race, national origin, and class harm our national interests in
GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO] (noting that minority and disadvantaged students receive inferior teachers, fewer resources, and reduced access to highquality curricula).
33. See Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Achievement Gaps Arise
from Opportunity Gaps, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA
MUST DO, supra note 32, at 1, 2–5.
34. Id. at 1, 3.
35. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in
WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN’S LIFE
CHANCES 91, 93 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011); EDUC. OPPORTUNITY MONITORING PROJECT, STANFORD CTR. FOR EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC ACHIEVEMENT GAPS, http://cepa.stanford.edu/
educational-opportunity-monitoring-project/achievement-gaps/race/#first (last
visited Oct. 27, 2018); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP READING REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/
reading_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=8; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP MATHEMATICS REPORT
CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE GAPS (2017), https://
nationsreportcard.gov/math_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=8; NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT CARD, NAEP
MATHEMATICS REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND SCORE
GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/math_2017/#nation/gaps?grade=4;
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT
CARD, NAEP READING REPORT CARD: NATIONAL STUDENT GROUP SCORES AND
SCORE GAPS (2017), https://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_2017/#/nation/gaps?
grade=4; NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S
REPORT CARD, 2015 MATHEMATICS AND READING AT GRADE 12: NATIONAL
SCORE GAPS (2015), https://nationsreportcard.gov/reading_math_g12_2015/
#reading/gaps.
36. See Michael Hansen et al., Have We Made Progress on Achievement
Gaps? Looking at Evidence from the New NAEP Results, BROOKINGS INST.:
BROWN CTR. CHALKBOARD (Apr. 17, 2018), https://brookings.edu/blog/brown
-center-chalkboard/2018/04/17/have-we-made-progress-on-achievement-gaps
-looking-at-evidence-from-the-new-naep-results.
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an educated democracy, a robust economy, and a just society.37
It is axiomatic that the citizenry must be educated to govern effectively in a democracy.38 Economic estimates of the impact of
the opportunity gap note that the failure of the United States to
invest in economically disadvantaged children will cost the country approximately five trillion dollars over the course of their
lives.39 This accounts for additional health care costs, criminal
justice experiences, and the cost of failing to take full advantage
of the talents of these children.40 In addition, if the graduation
rate of students of color could be raised to 90%, the United States
would add $6.6 billion annually to the economy.41 The 2018 report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights confirms that
high-poverty communities, who are frequently communities of
color, often do not possess the financial means to provide quality
schools and opportunities.42 Most importantly, students living in
low-income households and students of color constitute more
than half of all public school students.43 Therefore, the future of

37. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 6–8 (arguing that
growing education gaps threaten the economic and societal health of the United
States).
38. See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, A REPORT TO THE U.S. SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 12 (2013) (discussing the contributions of a strong education system to a healthy democracy).
39. CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 7.
40. See id. at 7–8.
41. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 13–14. The 2016
graduation rates were: African American 76.4%; Hispanic 79.3%; White 88.3%;
American Indian/Alaska Native 71.9%; and, economically disadvantaged students 77.6%. The graduation rate for Asian/Pacific Islander was not available
for this year. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC
HIGH SCHOOL 4-YEAR ADJUSTED COHORT GRADUATION RATE (ACGR), BY
RACE/ETHNICITY AND SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE
UNITED STATES, THE 50 STATES, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: SCHOOL YEAR
2015–16, https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/tables/ACGR_RE_and_characteristics_2015
-16.asp.
42. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5.
43. See STEVE SUITTS, S. EDUC. FOUND., NEW MAJORITY RESEARCH BULLETIN: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS NOW A MAJORITY IN THE NATION’S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2015), http://southerneducation.org/our-strategies/research-and
-publications/new-majority-diverse-majority-report-series/a-new-majority-2015
-update-low-income-students-now (reporting that economically disadvantaged
students are a majority in American public schools); Lesli A. Maxwell, U.S.
School Enrollment Hits Majority-Minority Milestone, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 19,
2014), https://edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01demographics.h34.html (reporting that students of color now constitute the majority of students in public
schools).
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the nation depends upon fully developing the talents and abilities of poor and minority students.
This Article offers my model for institutional design to
achieve an equitable education. This model embraces four elements: fair funding for schools, an equitable distribution of effective teachers, equitable access to high-quality preK-12 learning
opportunities, and integrated school settings.44 These elements
are drawn from research regarding the critical components of effective education reform as well as my experience in education
law and policy for over two decades. My model embraces the
premise that the best model for equity must incorporate research
on impactful education reform while acknowledging political and
practical feasibility and parsimony. As discussed in detail below,
these elements work synergistically to advance educational equity.
This Article shows that even though ESEA was passed in
part to bridge the opportunity and achievement gaps for disadvantaged and minority students and to support improvements to
education,45 ESSA will not provide sufficient support and incentives for states to achieve these goals. Fortunately, ESSA only
provides appropriations through fiscal year 2020,46 and thus,
lawmakers will soon begin to examine the law’s effectiveness
and possible reforms as reauthorization approaches. Indeed,
lawmakers are already keeping very close tabs on ESSA as evidenced by the numerous hearings about implementation47 and
44. Research on the benefits of each of these building blocks is provided in
Part II.
45. MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 31 (“ESEA was premised on the idea that
the federal government should intervene in . . . an educational crisis among
poor and minority children.”).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2016).
47. Congress has held eleven hearings on ESSA implementation since its
passage in December 2015. Every Student Succeeds Act: States Leading the Way:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 115th Cong.
(2018); ESSA Implementation: Exploring State and Local Reform Efforts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 115th Cong. (2017); Supplanting the Law and Local Education Authority through Regulatory Fiat: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Elementary, & Secondary Educ.
of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation: Perspectives from Education Stakeholders on Proposed Regulations:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ. Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong.
(2016); ESSA Implementation: Update from the U.S. Secretary of Education on
Proposed Regulations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor &
Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); Next Steps in K-12 Education: Examining Recent
Efforts to Implement the Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation:
Perspectives from Education Stakeholders: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
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Congress’s decision to disapprove the U.S. Department of Education’s (DOE) final regulations for the law.48 Therefore, this Article proposes a timely, comprehensive plan to guide the rapidly
approaching reauthorization.
This Article also contends that when Congress reauthorizes
ESEA, it should adopt an incremental approach for reform that
incentivizes and supports states in providing the essential elements of an equitable education.49 This incremental approach
involves gradual shifts to education federalism that would ultimately result in a more balanced federal-state partnership for
education that would expand state and local education capacity
for education reform.50 This partnership would embrace the federal government as the final guarantor of equitable access to an
excellent education, while giving states and localities significant
latitude on how equity should be implemented at the state and
local levels.51 These incremental reforms would disrupt ESSA’s
anemic approach to equity.
This Article builds upon my past scholarship in two principal ways. First, it assumes that a restructuring of education federalism will be necessary to advance equitable access to an excellent education.52 As I have demonstrated in prior work,

Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation in
States and School Districts: Perspectives from the U.S. Secretary of Education:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong.
(2016); Next Steps for K-12 Education: Upholding the Letter and Intent of the
Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016); ESSA Implementation in States and School Districts:
Perspectives from Education Leaders: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong. (2016); Next Steps for K-12 Education:
Implementing the Promise to Restore State and Local Control: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Early Childhood, Elementary, & Secondary Educ. of the H.
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. (2016).
48. Congressional Disapproval of Department of Education Rule, Pub. L.
No. 115-13, 131 Stat. 77 (2017); 81 Fed. Reg. 86,076 (Nov. 29, 2016).
49. I recently proposed policy reforms for school funding that enact incremental shifts to education federalism. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No Quick
Fix for Equity and Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education
Federalism, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 201 (2016).
50. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 959, 1004–05, 1015 (2015).
51. Id. at 1005, 1015 (arguing that education federalism would expand the
capacity of states to implement equitable policies). I apply my theory of education federalism from Disrupting Education Federalism in Kimberly Jenkins
Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an
Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 223–38 (2016).
52. Robinson, supra note 50, at 983–1017.
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federalism has served as a roadblock to equal educational opportunity and must be restructured to achieve greater equity and
excellence in education.53 Second, I build on my prior proposal
for an incremental restructuring of education federalism that
would gradually shift the balance of federal-state power over education to embrace federal policymaking strengths while retaining primary state and local control over education.54
Federal leadership, law, and policy will be necessary to enable states to fulfill their recent pledge to make educational equity a reality for all schoolchildren.55 My emphasis on the need
for an incremental restructuring of education federalism distinguishes my work from other ESSA scholarship. I recommend a
unique combination of law and policy levers that strategically
employ federal incentives, conditions, and mandates. This is in
contrast to most proposals for ESEA reauthorization that solely
focus on new conditions for federal education funds. Also, this
Article presents my model for institutional design for educational equity that draws together a substantial body of research
on the key components of an equitable and excellent education.
Part I describes ESSA with an emphasis on its approach to
equity and contrasts it with its predecessor, No Child Left Behind. Part II analyzes why ESSA’s approach to equity will prove
ineffective. Part III recommends how ESEA should be reauthorized by incrementally restructuring education federalism in
ways that would promote equitable access to an excellent education for all children.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS
ACT
President Johnson signed ESEA into law in 1965 as part of
his broader “war on poverty” because he viewed education as an
essential ingredient for mobility, and he acknowledged that
many schools did not have adequate resources to provide essential skills to children from low-income families.56 Title I of ESEA
directs additional funding to disadvantaged students and was
53. Id. at 972–83; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education
Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 293–305, 307–14, 322–30 (2013).
54. Robinson, supra note 49, at 220–37.
55. See THE ASPEN INST. EDUC. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 8 (discussing
state implementation strategies to promote educational equity); Burnette II, supra note 8 (reporting the meeting of state education chiefs to strategize policies
regarding educational equity).
56. MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 29.
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included as the primary vehicle to address the needs of these
students.57 With the passage of the Improving America’s Schools
Act of 1994, the aim of the legislation broadened to include high
achievement for all students, and this expansion ushered in federal support for the standards and accountability movement.58
Both No Child Left Behind and ESSA embraced this broader focus.59
Despite this larger aim, funding under ESEA, particularly
under Title I, still aims to reduce the adverse effects of poverty
on educational opportunities and outcomes. Title I is the centerpiece of the law and serves as the largest federal education aid
to communities with substantial numbers of schoolchildren living in poverty, even as the broader goal of improved achievement
for all students has gained ascendancy.60 For instance, ESSA,
like No Child Left Behind, requires test scores to be disaggregated by economic status and race61 to shine a spotlight on
whether schools, districts, and states are meeting the needs of
poor and minority students. Also like its predecessor, ESSA
obliges districts to intervene when these students are performing poorly and to institute efforts to close the achievement gap
between these students and their more affluent peers.62 Therefore, even though ESSA increases state autonomy for education
reform under ESEA, it remains worthwhile to assess the effectiveness of ESSA in improving the education of disadvantaged

57. See id. at 31.
58. See id. at 95–97.
59. See id. at 179; Charles Barone, What ESSA Says: Continuities and Departures, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 59–66.
60. See STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2014–15 (FISCAL YEAR 2015) 18–19 (2018); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 614, 623 (2013). But see Derek Black,
Leveraging Funding for Equity and Integration, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
227, 229–31 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Black, Leveraging Funding] [hereinafter THE ENDURING LEGACY
OF RODRIGUEZ] (observing that a gradual shift in focus towards general educational reform has made Title I funds “no longer targeted or conditional in any
meaningful sense”).
61. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(3)(C)(xiii) (2012) (repealed
2015); Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(B)(xi)(I) & (II)
(2016).
62. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (b)(1)(A), (3–5), (7), (8) (2012)
(repealed 2015); Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (d)(2)(B) (2016).
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and minority students because this aim remains a goal of this
bipartisan law.
ESEA is comprised of many programs with a wide variety of
aims, including programs to support neglected63 and migrant
children,64 language instruction for English learners,65 and support for the education of Native American children.66 Title I is
the largest program within ESEA, contains the major requirements of the law, and aims to support education of the disadvantaged.67 Title I includes 59% of ESEA’s funding at $16.4 billion
per year for fiscal year 2018.68
This Part briefly summarizes the key components of No
Child Left Behind before describing ESSA’s key requirements.
Understanding No Child Left Behind is essential for understanding ESSA because ESSA retains some of the same conditions as No Child Left Behind. Section A also highlights some of
the strengths and challenges that No Child Left Behind encountered. This research helps readers better understand ESSA. Section B explains the key requirements for ESSA.
A. THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001
No Child Left Behind ushered in the largest increase in federal involvement in the public schools in the nation’s history.69
No Child Left Behind aimed to reduce both achievement and opportunity gaps.70 The focus of No Child Left Behind’s accountability structures included the condition that states must implement “challenging” academic standards in math, reading, and
63. Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6421 (2016).
64. Id. § 6391.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 7401. Although many of the students in each of these programs
are also poor or minorities, examination of the effectiveness of ESEA to help
address the specific needs of these student groups is beyond the scope of this
Article.
67. See Barone, supra note 59, at 59–60; Pasachoff, supra note 60, at 614.
68. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FISCAL YEAR
2018 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/
budget/budget18/18action.pdf.
69. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 194–95.
70. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115
Stat. 1425, 1439 (2002) (noting that No Child Left Behind seeks “to close the
achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is
left behind” and “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and state academic assessments”).
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science for all students.71 All schools, not just schools that received Title I funding,72 were required to administer annual
math and reading tests aligned to these standards beginning in
the 2005–06 school year for third through eighth grade and once
in tenth through twelfth grades.73 Science testing began in the
2007–08 school year and occurred three times in third through
twelfth grades.74 Each state determined a proficient score and
published an annual state report card with proficiency scores
disaggregated by student economic disadvantage, gender, major
racial and ethnic groups, disabled students, and English language learners.75 Schools and districts also had to publish
whether students were making adequate yearly progress toward
the goal of proficiency for all students by 2014.76 States exercised
complete discretion over the standards because No Child Left
Behind prohibited any requirement that states submit state
standards to the Secretary of Education.77
Schools that received Title I funding were subject to accountability measures that became increasingly interventionist
as the number of years increased that the school did not achieve
adequate yearly progress. Schools were identified as in need of
improvement and provided with technical assistance after missing adequate yearly progress for any group of students for one
year; then students received the ability to transfer to another
school within the district after two consecutive years of the
school failing to make adequate yearly progress; and, after three
consecutive years of not making adequate yearly progress students could receive tutoring. Finally, a school had to undertake
corrective action after four consecutive years of failing to make
adequate yearly progress and underwent restructuring after five
consecutive years of failing to make adequate yearly progress.78
71. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012) (repealed 2015).
72. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 942 (2004).
73. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A)–(C) (2012) (repealed 2015).
74. Science testing occurred once in third through fifth grade, once in sixth
to ninth grade, and once in tenth through twelfth grades. See No Child Left
Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(v)(II) (2012) (repealed 2015).
75. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii) (2012) (repealed 2015).
76. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(F), (h)(1)(C)(v) (2012) (repealed 2015).
77. See id. § 6311(b)(1)(A) (2012) (repealed 2015).
78. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (2012) (repealed 2015); id. § 6316(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), (5), (7), (8) (one year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(7)(C) (two year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(5) (three year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(7) (four
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No Child Left Behind sought to close an opportunity gap by
requiring that Title I schools employ highly qualified teachers
for all subjects by 2005–06.79 For non-Title I schools, teachers of
“core academic subjects” were required to be highly qualified by
2005–06.80 A highly qualified teacher was required to have
earned a bachelor’s degree, possess subject matter competency,
and either have state certification or have passed a state licensing exam that provided a license to teach.81 States had to ensure
that inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers did not
teach poor and minority schoolchildren at higher rates than
other children.82
Although many criticize No Child Left Behind as being misguided federal education policy,83 it did spark some important
improvements to education. The law included a significant increase in federal funding for education: in 2002 spending was at
$56.2 billion, which was a $14.1 billion increase from 2001.84 All
states now have standards and assessments aligned to state
standards.85 Although most states had standards and tests before No Child Left Behind, only thirteen tested reading and math
annually and even fewer had robust approaches to accountability.86 The goal for all students to achieve proficiency on state
tests by 2014 was unattainable due to disparities in opportunities to learn as well as student ability.87 However, No Child Left
Behind succeeded in ensuring that states adopted an assessment
regime that informed parents and the public about how students
and subgroups of students were performing in every public
year requirements); id. § 6316(b)(8) (five year requirements).
79. See id. § 6319(a) (2012) (repealed 2015).
80. See id. § 6319(a)(2) (2012) (repealed 2015). “Core academic subjects” include a wide range of subjects including math, science, reading, language arts,
foreign languages, government, history, arts, and geography. See Improving the
Academic Achievement of the Disadvantaged, 34 C.F.R. § 200.55 (2003).
81. See No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 7801(23)(A)–(C) (2012) (repealed
2015).
82. See id. § 6311(b)(8)(C) (2012) (repealed 2015).
83. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Why the New Education Law Is Good for Children Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/10/opinion/why-the-new-education-law-is-good-for-children-left-behind
.html.
84. Patrick McGuinn, From ESEA to NCLB: The Growth of the Federal Role
and the Shift to Accountability, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra
note 5, at 13, 25.
85. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 244.
86. See MCGUINN, supra note 11, at 182.
87. See Black, supra note 3, at 1324–26.
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school. This information had not previously been available. Furthermore, while many schools and districts had learned to tolerate low student performance, by attaching consequences to low
performance, No Child Left Behind required educators to take
focused action to raise student achievement.88
Nevertheless, No Child Left Behind fell short of many of its
aims. It attempted to provide alternative school options for those
schools that did not make adequate yearly progress. However,
parents rarely exercised their school choice options because some
parents did not know of, or were not interested in, other schools
and some districts did not have enough successful schools to offer.89 Although some expected that No Child Left Behind’s sanctions would fall primarily on urban schools, as time went on,
growing numbers of middle class, mostly white suburban schools
were identified as in need of improvement.90 In addition, those
states with strong standards had higher rates of school failure,
while those with lower standards had fewer failures.91 This created perverse incentives to lower cut scores and standards.92
Eventually, as more and more schools entered improvement
and it was clear that the 2014 proficiency goal was unattainable,
states began to request waivers from No Child Left Behind’s conditions from the DOE.93 To receive a waiver, states were required
to adopt college and career ready standards and to measure student growth on high-quality assessments at least once in grades
three to eight and once in high school for math and reading.94

88. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (repealed
2015) (“Each state plan shall . . . include sanctions and rewards, such as bonuses
and recognition, the State will use to hold local educational agencies and public
elementary schools and secondary schools accountable for student achievement
and for ensuring that they make adequate yearly progress.”); see also REBECCA
R. SKINNER & LEAH ROSENSTIEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44898, HISTORY OF
THE ESEA TITLE I-A FORMULAS 41 (2017) (summarizing changes No Child Left
Behind made to grant funding and state accountability requirements, and new
requirements, including for the qualifications of teachers).
89. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 191.
90. See Jeffrey R. Henig et al., From NCLB to ESSA: Lessons Learned or
Politics Reaffirmed?, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at
29, 33.
91. See id.
92. Ryan, supra note 72, at 934.
93. See Patrick McGuinn, Incentives and Inducements: The Feds Fight Federalism, in BUSH-OBAMA SCHOOL REFORM: LESSONS LEARNED 51, 59–61 (Frederick M. Hess & Michael Q. McShane eds., 2018).
94. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1 (2012), https://www2.ed
.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html.
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The standards requirement for waivers was viewed as an unwelcome federal push toward the Common Core Standards, which
are a set of rigorous standards developed by academics and assessment specialists in response to a request from the National
Governors Association and the Council of Chief State School Officers.95 DOE permitted states to set new “ambitious but achievable . . . annual measurable objectives” that would guide school
improvement efforts and to publish performance on school report
cards.96 The waivers released states from the interventions prescribed in No Child Left Behind, but states were required to intervene in the bottom 5% of schools.97 The waivers also released
districts from having to employ highly qualified teachers, and
instead, states were required to evaluate teachers based in part
on student growth on assessments.98 The waivers retained the
requirement that states ensure that poorly qualified teachers did
not teach low-income and minority students at higher rates than
other children.99 Forty-three states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico received waivers from No Child Left Behind.100
ESEA waivers ultimately sowed seeds of discontent on the left
and the right, and it was this widespread discontentment that
led to passage of ESSA.101
B. THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT
When President Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds
Act (ESSA) into law, lawmakers on both sides of the political
spectrum as well as state leaders and educators celebrated the
passage of a bipartisan law.102 ESEA was more than seven years
95. See Frederick M. Hess & Max Eden, Introduction, in THE EVERY STUACT, supra note 5, at 1, 7; Elaine McArdle, What Happened to
the Common Core?, HARV. EDUC. MAG (Sept. 3, 2014), https://gse.harvard.edu/
news/ed/14/09/what-happened-common-core; Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://corestandards.org/about-the
-standards/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
96. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1–2 (2012), https://www2
.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html.
97. See id. at 1, 6.
98. See id. at 2.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 1–2.
101. Henig et al., supra note 90, at 29, 39–40. On the right, Republicans
charged the Obama administration with federal overreach into an area of state
and local control. On the left, the administration’s emphasis on school choice
and the rapid implementation of the Common Core standards by some states as
their chosen method for implementing college- and career-ready standards led
many teachers unions to oppose No Child Left Behind and the waivers. See id.
102. See Hess & Eden, supra note 95, at 1; Klein, supra note 17, at 43, 57.
DENT SUCCEEDS
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overdue for reauthorization, and ESSA escaped the partisan
gridlock that had blocked other legislation.103 Republicans heralded the substantial reduction in federal involvement in education, while Democrats emphasized the guardrails that limited
state and district discretion and kept a civil rights emphasis on
the needs of disadvantaged and minority students.104 This Section notes the key requirements for ESSA with an emphasis on
its requirements relating to equity.
At the outset, it is worth noting that ESSA sometimes
merely requires disclosure of important data that might reveal
an opportunity or achievement gap and at other times it requires
both disclosure and that the gap be addressed. Part II analyzes
why neither approach is successful in ESSA.
1. ESSA on Standards and Testing
ESSA requires states to maintain “challenging” academic
content standards that are aligned to the requirements to enter
colleges as well as career and technical education in the state.105
ESSA retains the No Child Left Behind testing regime for math,
reading, and science.106 The results of the assessments must be
disaggregated at the school, district, and state level by major racial and ethnic groups, economic disadvantage, disability, English proficiency status, gender, and migrant status.107
ESSA provides states the flexibility to establish their own
long-term goals that include student proficiency on state tests,
English language proficiency, and high school graduation
rates.108 States must choose four indicators for the accountability system, including three academic indicators: proficiency on
state tests, proficiency in English, and student growth in elementary and middle schools or graduation rates in high
schools.109 These indicators in aggregate must weigh much more
103. See Klein, supra note 17, at 43, 57.
104. See id. at 54–55, 57.
105. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A), (D) (2016).
106. The math and reading assessments must be administered annually in
grades three to eight and once in high school, while the science assessments
must be administered at least once in grades three to five, six to nine, and ten
through twelve. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B).
107. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(xi). ESSA allows States to administer alternative
assessments to students with severe disabilities as long as the percentage of
students taking such assessments does not exceed 1%. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(D)(i).
108. See id. § 6311(c)(4)(A).
109. ESSA adopted new standards for English language learners that are
aimed to help them attain English proficiency. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (c)(4)(B)
(Supp. IV 2016); Barone, supra note 59, at 61.
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than the fourth indicator.110 The fourth indicator assesses
“school quality or student success” and can include such factors
as the engagement of students or educators, the opportunity to
attend and completion of advanced courses, readiness for postsecondary opportunities, and school safety and climate.111 All results from state assessments must be shared in a comprehensive
review of academic performance for each school and district that
is concise and comprehensible by the public.112 In addition, individual student report cards must include a student’s performance on state assessments and the report cards must allow
parents, teachers, and school leaders to understand a student’s
academic performance and assess the needs of the student.113
2. ESSA on Accountability
ESSA identifies four categories of schools for intervention.
Beginning at least once every three school years after the 2017–
18 school year, a state must identify schools for “comprehensive
support and improvement” if they are among the lowest 5% on
performance in the state of those that receive ESSA funding or
are a public high school in which one third or more of the students fail to graduate.114 When a subgroup of students at a school
consistently underperforms as defined by each state, ESSA requires states to identify the school for targeted support and improvement.115 ESSA requires additional targeted support and
improvement when a subgroup of students tests in the bottom
5% of students.116
ESSA eliminated the school interventions required by No
Child Left Behind. In their place, ESSA requires that when a
school is in need of comprehensive support and improvement,
the district must partner with stakeholders to develop a plan to
improve performance on state indicators that responds to an assessment of needs in the school; adopts “evidence-based interventions;”117 and, identifies any inequities in resources that the

110. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(4)(B), (C)(ii) (2016).
111. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(v)(I)–(II).
112. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(A)–(B).
113. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)(x).
114. Id. § 6311(c)(4)(D).
115. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(A), (B).
116. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(C).
117. Although the requirement that interventions be “evidence-based” could
strengthen the quality of school interventions, education law scholar Eloise Pasachoff provides a compelling analysis of why this requirement may not achieve

2018]

RESTRUCTURING EDUCATION EQUITY

935

plan will address.118 The school, district, and state must approve
the plan and the state must periodically monitor and review the
plan.119 If, in no more than four years, the school has not met
state-defined criteria for progress, the state must intervene with
“more rigorous . . . action” that may involve changing operations
at the school level.120 When a school is identified for targeted
support and improvement or additional targeted support and intervention due to a low-performing subgroup, the school must
develop a plan that meets similar criteria and that is approved
and monitored by the district.121 The district must follow up with
additional action if improvement is not made in the timeframe
set by the state.122
3. ESSA on Resource Equity, Teacher Quality, and DOE
Oversight
ESSA contains numerous requirements that Congress included to shine a light on disparities in educational opportunity.
For example, ESSA requires reporting on disparities in funding.123 In state report cards, state plans must include, for each
district and school, per-pupil spending of federal, state, and local
funds, including actual personnel spending, by source of
funds.124 Districts also must publish per-pupil spending by
school.125
ESSA also requires districts and states to report the number
and percentage of students enrolled in early childhood programs,
dual enrollment programs, as well as advanced coursework that

the hoped-for results. In short, she contends that the evidence-based requirements in ESSA do not significantly constrain policy choices, underestimate implementation challenges, and overlook the significant disagreements on what to
do. Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in
Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933, 1936–37
(2017).
118. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(1)(B) (2016).
119. Id. § 6311(d)(1)(B)(v)–(vi).
120. Id. § 6311(d)(3)(A).
121. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(B).
122. Id. § 6311(d)(2)(B)(v), (C).
123. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(x).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 6311(h)(2)(C). These provisions will not take effect until the report
cards for the 2018–19 school year due to a one-year extension on compliance
from the DOE. Jason Botel, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY &
SECONDARY EDUC. (June 28, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/
perpupilreqltr.pdf.
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earns college credit while in high school.126 In addition, states
and districts must publish data on school climate measures such
as in-school and out-of-school suspensions, school-related arrests, and incidents of bullying, harassment, and violence.127
ESSA maintains the prior Title I funding formulas.128 ESSA
retained the longstanding requirement that Title I and non-Title
I schools must maintain comparable resources.129 ESSA made
only minor adjustments to the supplement-not-supplant requirement that prohibits federal funds from supplanting rather than
supplementing state and local funds and the maintenance of effort requirement that attempts to prevent states and districts
from lowering support for public schools.130
ESSA requires that states both disclose inequities in the
qualifications of teachers as well as remedy these inequities.131
ESSA eliminates the No Child Left Behind requirement that all
schools must employ highly qualified teachers and does not require states to evaluate teachers based on student performance
as the No Child Left Behind waivers demanded.132 Instead,
ESSA merely requires that teachers be certified as defined by
state standards.133 States and districts must publicly report the
qualifications of teachers, including disaggregating this data by
high- and low-poverty schools, as well as the number and per-

126. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(viii)(II) (2016).
127. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(viii)(I).
128. Id. §§ 6333–39. ESSA does direct additional funds to rural schools
through Title II. See SKINNER & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 88, at 45 (“[A]lmost all
of the changes to the Title I-A formulas were removed in conference. One notable change made by the ESSA was an increase in the set-aside for the Bureau
of Indian Education (BIE) and Outlying Areas from 1.0% to 1.1%, provided the
total amount available for state grants would not be less than the amount available in FY2016.”).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1)(B) (2016).
130. Id. § 6321(b); see SKINNER & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 88, at 45 & n.273;
Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Michael Casserly, ESSA and Urban Public
Schools: Ambivalence and Opportunity, in THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT,
supra note 5, at 137, 142.
131. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix).
132. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 1001(1), 129 Stat.
1802, 1814 (2015) (repealing 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)); see U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
ESEA FLEXIBILITY, https://ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html
(last modified May 12, 2018) (describing the waiver process under NCLB); Ashley Jochim, ESSA and State Policy: What’s Next for Education Policy?, in THE
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, supra note 5, at 121, 131.
133. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(2)(J) (2016).
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centage of teachers who are inexperienced, teaching with provisional or emergency credentials, and out-of-field teachers.134
ESSA also requires states to implement plans to ensure that lowincome and minority students are not disproportionately taught
by “ineffective, out-of-field, or inexperienced teachers.”135 This
provision requires the state plan to identify how it will evaluate
and report to the public its progress on achieving this goal.136 No
Child Left Behind included a similar provision.137
Title II of ESSA provides grants to states to raise the quality
of teachers, principals, and school leaders and their effectiveness
at improving student achievement, as well as to improve the equitable distribution of teachers.138 Most of the funding is passed
directly to districts and the DOE also receives funds under Title
II.139 The state grants may support a wide range of activities to
improve teacher quality, including reforming teacher certification, licensure or tenure requirements; supporting districts in
designing teacher and principal evaluation systems that include
student growth; and, improving the equitable distribution of effective teachers, among other activities.140
ESSA explicitly limits the authority of the Secretary of Education in response to concerns that Secretary Arne Duncan
overreached when he issued waivers to No Child Left Behind
that contained numerous terms that sought to accomplish President Obama’s education agenda.141 For instance, ESSA automatically approves state plans unless the Secretary notifies a
134. Id. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix).
135. Id. § 6311(g)(1)(B).
136. Id.; § 6311(b)(8)(C) (noting that state plans must include “the specific
steps the State educational agency will take to ensure that both schoolwide programs and targeted assistance schools provide instruction by highly qualified
instructional staff as required by sections 6314(b)(1)(C) and 6315(c)(1)(E) of this
title, including steps that the State educational agency will take to ensure that
poor and minority children are not taught at higher rates than other children
by inexperienced, unqualified, or out-of-field teachers, and the measures that
the State educational agency will use to evaluate and publicly report the progress of the State educational agency with respect to such steps”);
137. No Child Left Behind, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(8)(C) (2012) (repealed 2015).
138. See id. § 6601.
139. See id. § 6603(a)–(b) (authorizing appropriations to states and local education agencies and then national activities); Alyson Klein et al., A Guide to
State ESSA Plans: Goals, Teacher Quality, and More, EDUC. WK. (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/a-guide-to-state-essa-plans-goals
-teacher-quality.html.
140. See 20 U.S.C. § 6611(c)(4)(B)(i)–(iii) (2016).
141. Id. § 6311(e)(1)(B); Henig et al., supra note 90, at 38–39. For an argument that Secretary Duncan exceeded his authority in issuing the waivers,
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state within 120 days of submission of the plan that the plan is
not in compliance with the law.142 The Secretary also is prohibited from influencing states to adopt the Common Core Standards,143 directing or controlling a school’s curriculum or program
of instruction,144 or providing support for the development of a
national test in reading, math or any other subject, including a
test aligned to the Common Core.145
Despite the broad aims of ESSA and its desire to increase
state autonomy for implementing education reforms, it retains
the goal of improving outcomes for economically disadvantaged
and minority students as well as greater equity in education
within the aims of the law.146 The next Part presents my model
for the institutional design of equitable schools, which includes
four building blocks for meeting the needs of disadvantaged and
minority students. It then analyzes how ESSA will fall short of
achieving its aims for enhancing outcomes for these students
and promoting equity because it does not provide states and districts the appropriate incentives and supports to provide these
building blocks.
II. HOW ESSA MISSES THE MARK FOR EQUITY
The United States today is creating, tolerating, and reinforcing growing opportunity gaps. Children from different socioeconomic statuses and races too often live in separate and unequal
worlds.147 The most powerful federal response to educational inequities, ESEA, will not be the catalyst that is needed to guide
states in remedying these disparities. ESSA is not effectively designed to provide states the incentives that are needed to ensure
that they provide disadvantaged and minority students equitable access to an excellent education.
This Part provides my model for institutional design of an
equitable education, which aims to provide excellent educational
opportunities for all students. It includes four building blocks for
meeting the needs of disadvantaged and minority students: fair
please see Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by Waiver?, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 607 (2015).
142. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(a)(4)(A)(v), 7871(a) (2016).
143. Id. §§ 6311(j), 7906a(a).
144. Id. § 7907(a).
145. Id. § 7909.
146. Id. § 6301.
147. CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 3–4; U.S. COMM’N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5.
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funding, an equitable distribution of effective teachers, highquality preK-12 opportunities to learn, and economic and racial
integration. Disparities within each of these building blocks substantially contribute to opportunity gaps.148 Each Section begins
with research showing that these building blocks are not being
provided and why this matters to the success of disadvantaged
students. Each Section then critiques how ESSA fails to offer
sufficient incentives and support for providing these critical
building blocks.
My model for institutional design for equity differs from
ESSA’s approach to equity in numerous ways. My model seeks
to remedy the root causes of the opportunity gaps that lead to
achievement gaps in ways that ESSA does not. Rather than including conditions that insist that states address such essential
foundations for equity as fair funding and high-quality preK-12
resources, ESSA mostly focuses on exposing achievement gaps
and telling states to fix these symptoms of the broken foundation
of our education system.149 When ESSA does attempt to remedy
aspects of the opportunity gap, such as teacher quality or disparities in resources, the flawed design and limited enforcement
ability of the DOE will make these requirements ineffectual.150
My model also offers a comprehensive approach to education
reforms to achieve educational equity that ESSA lacks. Instead
of taking on the critical design flaws of the nation’s education
system, ESSA tinkers at the margins of reform in ways that will
not ignite lasting change. Unlike ESSA, my model identifies the
essential components of reform necessary to achieve educational
equity while leaving substantial flexibility for states and districts to tailor these components to their needs. It includes the
ability to advance equity through a variety of reforms such as
innovative teacher training programs, on-line learning, and
school choice, including magnet and charter schools. My model
also creates a synergy among multiple reforms that is greater
than each single reform.
My model recognizes that the implementation of No Child
Left Behind revealed that states and districts do not always pos-

148. See generally CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1 (discussing
the scope and causes of educational opportunity gaps).
149. See Aldeman, supra note 5, at 91, 94–98.
150. For an analysis of ESSA’s flawed approach to remedying opportunity
gaps requirements, see infra Parts II.B (teacher quality) and II.C (resource inequities).
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sess the knowledge and capacity needed to design and implement effective reforms.151 For instance, when districts had to implement corrective action or the restructuring of schools under
No Child Left Behind, which were intended to be the most systemic reforms, these efforts prompted some changes to schools
“but fell short of what a lay observer might have considered dramatic reforms.”152 Many state departments of education also
lacked the expertise and capacity to guide reform under No Child
Left Behind.153 States similarly have reported under ESSA that
they set low criteria to identify schools for improvement because
they have concerns about their capacity to offer support to a substantial number of schools.154 Lastly, while ESSA will result in
a reduction in real per-pupil federal education spending155 and
federal education spending is expected to decrease in real dollars
over the next ten years,156 my model calls for an increase in the
federal investment in education to support comprehensive and
lasting reform that advances educational equity. This increase
in federal education funding would expand the capacities of
states and districts to implement reforms.
When assessing whether ESSA will enhance or undermine
equity, it is important to understand that the initial reviews of
state ESSA plans show that states have not prioritized equity.157
For instance, the Education Trust’s 2017 review of ESSA plans
found that “[f]or all of the talk about equity surrounding ESSA,
151. See PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY
MEETS STATE AND LOCAL REALITIES 49, 83–85 (2011).
152. Id. at 83.
153. See id. at 49.
154. See NATASHA USHOMIRSKY ET AL., THE EDUC. TR., TRENDS IN STATE
ESSA PLANS: EQUITY ADVOCATES STILL HAVE WORK TO DO 8–9 (2017).
155. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 103 (explaining that ESSA’s 7.8% increase
for Title I over four years will not keep pace with the 8.2% increase that would
be required for ESSA to keep pace with a modest inflation adjustment).
156. JULIA B. ISAACS ET AL., URBAN INST., KIDS’ SHARE 2018: REPORT ON
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN THROUGH 2017 AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS 52 (2018). Although federal education funding has increased from 2016
to 2017, a study of the trend of this funding finds that it will decline both in real
dollars and as a percentage of the gross domestic product over the next decade.
Id. at 14, 52.
157. As discussed in greater detail in Part II.B infra, an analysis of state
plans to implement ESSA’s requirements on the equitable distribution of teachers found that states generally have evaded these requirements. See Elizabeth
Ross, State ESSA Plans Fail to Adequately Address Educator Inequities,
REALCLEAREDUCATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://realcleareducation.com/articles/
2017/11/14/state_essa_plans_fail_to_adequately_address_educator_inequities
.html.
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too many state leaders have taken a pass on clearly naming and
acting on schools’ underperformance for low-income students,
students of color, students with disabilities, and English learners.”158 In addition, “the vast majority of states” will determine
school ratings based entirely or mostly on the average schoolwide performance thereby ignoring student subgroup performance when rating schools.159 Some states, such as Washington
and Indiana, are providing ratings for subgroups, but these subgroup ratings typically do not influence a school’s rating and
thus are unlikely to spark improvements for, and investments
in, improving subgroup performance.160 Ultimately, the decision
by states to base school ratings on averages will allow many
schools to receive high ratings even though many historically
disadvantaged students are showing minimal or no improvement.161
In addition, states must identify a school for targeted support and improvement if a subgroup is “consistently underperforming” as defined entirely by the state.162 States exercised
their discretion to set low performance expectations for the performance of subgroups.163 For instance, states such as Washington and New Mexico are only defining underperformance as performance in the bottom 5% of all students.164 This approach
conflates two distinct categories that were intended for improvement under ESSA—targeted support for “consistently underperforming” subgroups and additional targeted support and improvement for a subgroup that is performing as poorly as the
bottom 5% of all students.165 This lackluster commitment to closing achievement gaps reveals that states are already not living
up to their recent public commitment to prioritize equity.

158. USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 2.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 6.
161. See id. at 6–7.
162. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(2)(A) (2016).
163. USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 8.
164. Id.
165. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(2)(B) (requiring states to identify a school
for targeted support and improvement if a subgroup of students consistently
underperforms as defined by the state), with id. § 6311(d)(2)(C) (requiring additional targeted support and improvement when a subgroup of students tests in
the bottom 5% of all students).
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A. FAIR FUNDING
1. The Challenge of Inequitable Funding and Why It Matters
Funding provides the foundation upon which education systems are built. Three funding sources support schools: state, local, and federal funding. The most recent data indicates that
states provide 46.2% of funding, districts provide 45%, and the
federal government provides 8.7%.166 The percentage of the state
contribution varies widely by state, with a high of 89.8% in Vermont and a low of 26% in Illinois.167 Districts primarily raise
their contribution through property taxes, which contributes to
funding disparities due to the wealth differences between communities.168
Research has long confirmed that disadvantaged students
require more resources for them to be competitive with their
non-disadvantaged peers.169 A conservative estimate is that disadvantaged students need 40% more resources than other students, a figure that is based on the Title I funding formula,170
but some scholars contend that this is an underestimate of the
additional costs of successfully educating these students.171 For
instance, one study estimates that it costs at least twice as much
to educate a disadvantaged child to be as successful as his or her
peers.172 Additional funding for these students can provide ac-

166. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, DIG. EDUC. STAT.
Table 235.10 (July 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_
235.10.asp.
167. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, DIG. EDUC. STAT.
Table 235.20 (July 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_
235.20.asp.
168. Sean P. Corcoran, The Role of Local Revenues in Funding Disparities
Across School Districts, in BRUCE D. BAKER & SEAN P. CORCORAN, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, THE STEALTH INEQUITIES OF SCHOOL FUNDING: HOW STATE AND LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS PERPETUATE INEQUITABLE STUDENT SPENDING
55, 85 (2012); BETTY COX ET AL., THE COSTS OF EDUCATION: REVENUE AND
SPENDING IN PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 34 (2013).
169. JACK JENNINGS, PRESIDENTS, CONGRESS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION REFORM 179 (2015); Richard Rothstein, Why Children from Lower Socioeconomic Classes, on Average, Have Lower Academic
Achievement than Middle Class Children, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP:
WHAT AMERICA MUST DO, supra note 32, at 61, 61–69.
170. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 7.
171. E.g. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 4–5.
172. See William D. Duncombe & John Yinger, How Much More Does a Disadvantaged Student Cost? 17 (Ctr. for Policy Research at Syracuse Univ., Working Paper No. 60, 2004) (finding that the weights for disadvantaged or limited
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cess to a high-quality curriculum and supportive curricular resources; more learning time, such as strong after-school and
summer programs, as well as high-quality early childhood education; and, partnerships with outside providers, such as the foster care system or health care providers.173
Research also reveals that although the overwhelming majority of states do provide significant levels of additional state
funding to students from low-income families, the highest poverty districts typically receive less total state and local funding.174 Indeed, when federal funding for poor students is removed
from consideration, studies confirm that poor students oftentimes receive either less or the same funding as their more affluent peers.175 For example, the 2018 study by the Education Trust
of state and local funding found that nationally the districts with
the highest poverty receive approximately $1,000, or 7%, less per
student than the lowest poverty districts.176 For twenty-three
states, high and low-poverty districts received about the same
funding, while four states provided less funding to high-poverty
districts (this pattern is considered regressive).177 Twenty states
gave at least 5% more funding to low-poverty districts and six of
those states (Georgia, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, and Utah) provide at least 15% more to the districts with
the most poverty.178 Thus, this study confirms that twenty-seven
states do not provide high-poverty districts with the additional
funding they need to meet the needs of students in these districts.179 In addition, when this study accounted for the additional needs of disadvantaged students, it found even greater inequities in spending patterns.180

English proficient students should be between 111% and 215%).
173. NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, THE EDUC. TR., FUNDING
GAPS 2015: TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS
WHO NEED IT MOST 4 (2015); Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 77, 88–90;
Rothstein, supra note 169, at 62, 70.
174. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 6, 9.
175. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N,
supra note 38, at 18 (“The majority of states do not provide additional funding
for students living in high concentrations of poverty.”).
176. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 6.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2.
180. After this adjustment, high-poverty districts received $2,000 or 16%
less funding. Twenty rather than four states were regressive and seven rather
than twenty states provided more funding to high-poverty districts. Id. at 7.
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A 2018 study by the Education Law Center similarly found
that a majority of states do not provide high-poverty districts
with more state and local funding than low-poverty districts,
with thirty-seven states providing less (seventeen states) or the
same (twenty states) funding to high-poverty districts.181 State
funding systems also disadvantage many minority students. The
districts serving the highest percentages of minority students receive about $1,800, or 13% less per pupil, than districts with the
lowest percentages of students of color.182 These disparities led
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to conclude in a 2018 report
that “vast funding inequities in our state public education systems render the education available to millions of American public school students profoundly unequal.”183 When these disparities are aggregated among classrooms, schools, and districts,
they negatively impact the educational opportunities of disadvantaged and minority schoolchildren.184
Funding disparities are important because the longstanding
debate regarding whether money matters has concluded with a
consensus that money spent well matters.185 Compelling research supports this conclusion. For example, states that
adopted reforms that aimed to increase the adequacy of school
funding between 1990 and 2011 raised student achievement in

181. The 2018 report Is School Funding Fair? measures the distribution of
state and local funding relative to poverty. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9.
The report finds that seventeen states provide at least 5% or less funding to
districts with 30% poverty or more, twenty states provide essentially the same
funding to low- and high-poverty districts and only eleven states provide at least
5% more funding to districts with 30% or more students in poverty. See id. at 9;
see also EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 17. In 2017, scholars
at the Urban Institute conducted a study of the distribution of total funding and
found that “poor students in most states attend school districts that are about
as well funded as the districts nonpoor students attend in their state.” MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTIN BLAGG, THE URBAN INST., DO POOR KIDS GET
THEIR FAIR SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING? 14 (2017). However, when federal dollars that are targeted to poor students are excluded, the study found that even
though the state funding of education is largely progressive, “about half of the
states in our study still distribute relatively more local and state funding to
students not in poverty.” Id. at 7.
182. MORGAN & AMERIKANER, supra note 32, at 10.
183. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 9.
184. See USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 173, at 1.
185. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 1; Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at
97; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Creating New Pathways to Equal Educational Opportunity, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 263, 266.
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low-income districts and decreased achievement gaps.186 In contrast, the achievement gap increased in states without such reforms.187 Increased funding has been shown to increase graduation rates.188 School funding reform also can influence outcomes
beyond academic performance. For instance, one study found
that a 10% increase in per-pupil funding for twelve years of
schooling resulted in a 6% decrease in adult poverty, almost 10%
more in adult earnings, and almost half a year of additional
schooling.189 This study suggests that a 25% funding increase
during a child’s school years could eliminate the disparities in
outcomes between disadvantaged students and their peers.190
Other research confirms that states that effectively target additional resources to higher poverty districts experience improved
student achievement and smaller achievement gaps.191 Yet, the
majority of states do not provide sufficient funding for high-poverty children to attain even average levels of achievement.192
My prior research also identifies several shortcomings of
school funding systems beyond failing to provide disadvantaged
students the additional resources that they need.193 For instance, state funding systems often are not systematically designed to provide the funding necessary to enable all students to
successfully learn the content in state standards.194 In addition,
many states provide low funding levels that are insufficient to
provide an adequate education,195 “with the lowest funded states

186. See Julien LaFortune et al., Can School Finance Reforms Improve Student Achievement?, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://equitablegrowth.org/can-school-finance-reforms-improve-student
-achievement.
187. See id.
188. See C. Kirabo Jackson et al., How Money Makes a Difference: The Effects
of School Finance Reforms on Outcomes for Low Income Students, STAN. CTR.
FOR OPPORTUNITY POL’Y EDUC. (Nov. 2014), https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/sites/
default/files/publications/how-money-makes-difference-effects-school-finance
-reforms-outcomes-low-income-students.pdf.
189. See C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J.
ECON. 157, 160 (2016).
190. See id.
191. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 28.
192. See id.
193. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, How Reconstructing Education Federalism Could Fulfill the Aims of Rodriguez, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 213–20.
194. See id. at 214; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 17.
195. See Robinson, supra note 193, at 216.
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providing less than a third of what the highest funded states provide their schools.”196 Unfortunately, most states have failed to
adopt school funding systems that effectively address the needs
of the full complement of students, especially those who experience the greatest disadvantage due to disability, poverty, or limited English proficiency.197 States also have not developed effective accountability mechanisms to ensure that the funding
provided is used efficiently to improve student achievement and
attain other educational goals.198 These shortcomings compound
the damage done by the broken foundation of inequitable funding.
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge
ESSA generally retains the same Title I funding formulas
as well as the comparability, supplement-not-supplant, and
maintenance of effort requirements from No Child Left Behind,
and scholarly commentary on No Child Left Behind has established why these provisions will not result in fair funding. For
instance, scholars have shown how Title I funds are spread too
thinly and the formulas do not effectively acknowledge the adverse effects of concentrated poverty, among other concerns.199
ESSA will mean a decline in actual, per-pupil spending because
the 7.8% increase for Title I will provide less than the 8.2% increase that would be required to keep funding constant when adjustments are considered for a modest increase in inflation and
student enrollment.200 Similarly, despite the requirement that
Title I schools be comparable to non-Title I schools, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights noted in a 2018 report that “more
than 40 percent of Title I schools spent less on personnel perpupil than non-Title I schools at the same grade level and that
are within the same school district.”201 Congress failed to revise
this provision despite the fact that the provision’s comparability
requirement is illusory given a regulatory loophole that merely
requires “substantial comparability,” exempts teacher salaries,

196. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 28.
197. See id. at 1.
198. See Robinson, supra note 193, at 216.
199. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 102; Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Black, Leveraging Funding, supra note 60, at 233–41; Goodwin Liu, Improving Title I
Funding Equity Across States, Districts, and Schools, 93 IOWA L. REV. 973, 981
(2008).
200. See Aldeman, supra note 5, at 103.
201. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 9.
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and has left such wide discretion in interpretation that enforcement has been essentially impossible.202
The DOE attempted to strengthen the supplement-not-supplant provision through its ESSA regulations, but Congress met
this possibility with great hostility. Former U.S. Secretary of Education John King proposed a regulatory change to the supplement-not-supplant requirement that would have addressed the
fact that an estimated 5,750 Title I schools received about
$440,000 less from their states and districts annually than nonTitle I schools.203 The requirement would have required districts
to establish that they spent roughly the same amount of money,
including teachers’ salaries, on Title I schools and non-Title I
schools.204 Congress and interest groups, including the Council
of Chief State School Officers, expressed strong opposition to this
proposed regulatory revision.205 The DOE eventually withdrew
its proposal in early 2017 due to this strenuous opposition.206
202. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 102; Black, supra note 3, at 1339; Black, Leveraging Funding, supra note 60, at 231, 239; Derek W. Black, The Congressional
Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 315–16 (2010).
203. See Fact Sheet: Supplement-not-Supplant Under Title I of the Every Student Succeeds Act, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Aug. 31, 2016), https://ed.gov/news/press
-releases/fact-sheet-supplement-not-supplant-under-title-i-every-student
-succeeds-act.
204. See id.
205. See Next Steps in K-12 Education: Examining Recent Efforts to Implement the Every Student Succeeds Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. &
the Workforce, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (Statement of John Kline, Congressman)
(“The second troubling sign surrounds the long standing policy that Federal
funds are a supplement and do not supplant State and local resources . . . . Last
year, Congress decided the rule would be enforced equally across all schools.
Now school districts must simply show that funds are distributed fairly, without
prescribing a specific approach or outcome. The law explicitly prohibits the Secretary from interfering, yet that is precisely what you are proposing to do. What
the Department is proposing would be both illegal and harmful to students and
communities.”); ESSA Implementation in States and School Districts Perspectives from the U.S. Secretary of Education: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 114th Cong 2 (2016) (statement of Lamar
Alexander, Sen.) (“Mr. Secretary, not only is what you’re doing against the law,
but the way you’re trying to do it is against another provision in the law. To
accomplish your goals on comparability, you are using the so-called “supplement
not supplant” provision that is supposed to keep local school districts from using
Federal title I dollars as a replacement for State and local dollars in low-income
schools. . . . We included specific prohibitions in the so-called “supplement not
supplant” provision that would prohibit you from doing the very things you are
proposing to do.”); Alyson Klein, Education Department Withdraws Controversial ESSA Spending Proposal, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://blogs.edweek
.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/01/essa_john_b_king_jr_withdraws_.html.
206. See Klein, supra note 205.
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Given that ESSA maintains the status quo on provisions
that directly influence Title I funding, the greatest potential for
ESSA to improve the fairness of school funding is its requirement that districts must publish per-pupil spending data for
each school and states must report this information for each district and school. This and other ESSA provisions are intended to
offer the public better information and enable it to advance equity in student access to resources.207 Education scholar Marguerite Roza predicts that making these inequities public will create
a “sunlight effect” that will initially spark outrage and ultimately reform in communities where schools for low-income and
minority children are provided less funding.208 Others also note
that this data will put powerful information into the hands of
local advocates, including those litigating school funding disputes.209
I agree that this new data in the hands of parents, scholars,
policymakers, and reformers will spark new conversations about
funding inequities and what should be done about them. However, I predict that this requirement will not have as dramatic
an impact on reducing funding inequities as some hope for several reasons. First, ESSA does not require states or districts to
take any action when funding disparities are revealed. Thus,
states and districts will still receive millions in federal funding
without addressing funding inequities.
Second, many who are outraged about the prevalent disparities will lack a judicial forum to challenge them. The Supreme
Court closed the courthouse door to federal claims for a right to
education that might have remedied inequitable funding disparities in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
when it held that the U.S. Constitution does not recognize an
explicit or implicit right to education.210 In at least nineteen
states, plaintiffs have never prevailed in school funding litigation.211 One of these states is Virginia, where in the 1994 decision Scott v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the Commonwealth’s constitutional provisions requiring
207. S. REP. NO. 114-231, at 29 (2016).
208. Marguerite Roza, The Sunlight Effect: More Equitable Spending on Its
Way Regardless of Rulemaking, BROOKINGS BROWN CTR. CHALKBOARD (Apr.
27, 2016), https://brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2016/04/27/the
-sunlight-effect-more-equitable-spending-on-its-way-regardless-of-rulemaking.
209. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 103.
210. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973);
Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 185, at 264.
211. See Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 185, at 277.
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the legislature to maintain public schools and “to seek to ensure”
that they provide high-quality education did not require “substantial equality” in public school spending between or within
school districts.212 Instead, the Virginia Constitution entrusted
the quality of the public schools to the sole province of the legislature.213 Other states also have concluded that school funding
remains within the exclusive and unreviewable purview of the
legislature.214 In addition, even where plaintiffs have been successful in school funding litigation, reforms have been very slow
to secure and maintain, as many state legislatures frequently
resisted enacting the necessary reforms, particularly when predominantly minority districts prevailed in court.215 Even those
who have brought successful school funding litigation support
the development of a federal forum for funding litigation because
state courts do not provide adequate protection for disadvantaged students.216
Third, poor and minority communities possess limited political power and influence to secure equitable reform through
state legislatures and local school boards.217 Most state legislatures are not interested in increasing educational equity.218
State legislatures have long had access to the data that shows
enduring inequities, yet education scholar and reformer Cynthia
Brown has noted that “despite this ready access to information
that can and does reveal inequities, state efforts to correct even
glaring problems are rare.”219 Similarly, many local governments will not provide effective avenues for reform. Local participation in school governance is quite low with no more than 10–
212. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1186 (Ill.
1996) (“The framers of the 1970 Constitution embraced this limited construction
that the constitutional efficiency requirement authorized judicial review of
school district boundaries, but they did not intend to otherwise limit legislative discretion.”).
215. RYAN, supra note 27, at 153, 171; David G. Sciarra & Danielle Farrie,
From Rodriguez to Abbott: New Jersey’s Standards-Linked School Funding Reform, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 119, 125–33.
216. Michael A. Rebell, Rodriguez Past, Present, and Future, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 60, at 65, 72–75; Sciarra & Farrie, supra
note 215, at 133–39.
217. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education
Through the No Child Left Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 625, 633 (2011).
218. Brown, supra note 23, at 166.
219. See id.
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15% of voters participating in school board elections.220 Many local school boards limit the discussion of citizens at public meetings and the discussions often do not influence districts’ decisions.221 The limited political influence of many disadvantaged
and minority communities suggests that they may lack the leverage to demand change.
Finally, the impacts of funding disparities have been plain
for all to see for generations, including in New York Times bestselling books by such authors as Jonathan Kozol beginning in
the 1990s and Robert Putnam in 2015.222 These disparities are
also in plain view in just a short drive from many cities to their
surrounding suburbs.223 The pervasiveness and consistency of
these disparities reveals that the nation has decided to tolerate
and even embrace these disparities. Therefore, while ESSA’s requirements to publish per-pupil funding data could spark some
reform, it is more likely that only limited reform will occur when
citizens, advocacy groups, and state and local governments provide the catalyst for reform. History suggests that federal incentives and conditions that support funding reform will be necessary for states and localities to initiate and sustain
comprehensive funding reform that provides fair funding.
B. AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE TEACHERS
Scholars concur that access to high-quality teachers is the
most important resource for student success, particularly for the
success of disadvantaged students.224 Achieving this goal requires, among other reforms, recruiting and retaining high-quality teachers for disadvantaged and minority students, offering
impactful professional development and feedback as well as in-

220. See Michael W. Kirst, Turning Points: A History of American School
Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14, 38 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
221. See Wilson, supra note 217, at 633.
222. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS (1992); JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (2005); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR
KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015).
223. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 1, 3.
224. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38; LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 40, 43 (James A. Banks ed.,
2010); Michael A. Rebell, Mandating Truly “Highly Qualified” Teachers for the
Future of Education, in TEACHERS OF THE FUTURE, SCHOOLS OF THE FUTURE
69–70 (2007).
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creasing the selectivity of teacher hiring and retention decisions.225 The research described below establishes that disadvantaged and minority students are consistently provided lower
quality teachers and that the inequitable distribution of teachers
has an adverse effect on their success. I also analyze why ESSA
will not provide adequate support for ensuring the equitable distribution of effective teachers.
1. The Challenge of the Inequitable Distribution of Effective
Teachers and Why It Matters
Research confirms that low-income and minority students
are educated by significantly less experienced and less qualified
teachers, which harms their academic outcomes.226 These inequities occur just as often within schools as between schools.227
Indeed, leading education expert Linda Darling-Hammond has
noted that “[b]y every measure of qualifications—certification,
subject matter background, pedagogical training, selectivity of
college attended, test scores, or experience—less qualified teachers are found in schools serving greater numbers of low-income

225. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38–39.
226. See Frank Adamson & Linda Darling-Hammond, Funding Disparities
and the Inequitable Distribution of Teachers: Evaluating Sources and Solutions,
20 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 5 (2012) (“[L]ow-salary districts serve
students with higher needs, offer poorer working conditions, and hire teachers
with significantly lower qualifications, who typically exhibit higher turnover.
We find that districts serving the highest proportions of minority and low-income students have about twice as many uncredentialed and inexperienced
teachers as do those serving the fewest.”); Goldhaber et al., Uneven Playing
Field? Assessing the Teacher Quality Gap Between Advantaged and Disadvantaged Students, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 293, 293 (2015) (“We demonstrate that
in elementary school, middle school, and high school classrooms, virtually every
measure of teacher quality we examine—experience, licensure exam scores, and
value added—is inequitably distributed across every indicator of student disadvantage—free/reduced-price lunch status, underrepresented minority, and low
prior academic performance.”); Glenda L. Partee, Attaining Equitable Distribution of Effective Teachers in Public Schools, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (2014),
https://americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2014/04/11
/87695/attaining-equitable-distribution-of-effective-teachers-in-public-schools
(“There are near-unanimous findings that the best teachers—those capable of
improving student achievement—are not equitably distributed across the spectrum of schools with concentrations of high- and low-poverty students and
schools with high and low concentrations of students of color.”). High-poverty
schools experience higher rates of teacher turnover, particularly when the
school educates high concentrations of minority students. Benjamin Scafidi et
al., Race, Poverty, and Teacher Mobility, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 145, 145 (2007).
227. See Partee, supra note 226, at 5.
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and minority students.”228 The fact that disadvantaged and minority students typically receive less effective teachers across
multiple measures229 confirms the deeply entrenched nature of
this problem throughout the United States.
Studies of students, schools, districts, and states confirm
that the background, preparation, certification, and experience
of teachers exerts a substantial influence on student achievement.230 As the proportion of teachers who are uncertified, inexperienced, and underprepared increases, student achievement
decreases.231 Teacher knowledge impacts student outcomes, particularly in mathematics, yet disadvantaged students are less
likely than children from high-income families to be taught by
teachers with high knowledge levels.232 High-poverty schools are
less likely than low-poverty schools to have a math or science
teacher who is teaching in her or his field.233 High-poverty
schools also have significantly fewer teachers with a master’s degree than those in low-poverty schools.234 Some research indicates that teachers who have taught for at least two years or
more are more effective than teachers with one year or less of
teaching experience.235 Children from disadvantaged households
have less access to teachers with at least two years of experience.236 In addition, novice science and math teachers are more
common in high-poverty schools than low-poverty schools, and
are more common in high-minority schools than low-minority
schools.237
Research also shows that instructional quality strongly influences the amount students learn and confirms the impact of
228. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 87.
229. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38 (“[N]o matter
what the measure, [disadvantaged students] get less-effective teachers compared to higher-income students.”); Goldhaber et al., supra note 226, at 304
(“[A]cross nearly every combination of school level, student disadvantage indicator, and indicator of low teacher quality, disadvantaged students have lowerquality teachers compared to advantaged students, on average.”).
230. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 224, at 87.
231. See id. at 89.
232. See Stephen W. Raudenbush, The Brown Legacy and the O’Connor
Challenge: Transforming Schools in the Images of Children’s Potential, 38
EDUC. RESEARCHER 169, 175 (2009) (citations omitted).
233. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012
1-26 app. tbl. 1-19 (2012).
234. See id. at 1-22, appendix table 1-11.
235. See Raudenbush, supra note 232, at 175 (citations omitted).
236. See id.
237. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 233, at 1-25.
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such instructional factors as adequate instructional time, a robust curriculum, and aligning instruction to the abilities of students. Children of different races with similar abilities perform
similarly when they receive the same quality of instruction.238
Schools with high concentrations of low-income and minority
students experience more teacher turnover than other schools239
and “the constant staff churn consigns a large share of children
in high-need schools to a parade of relatively ineffective teachers, leading to higher rates of remediation, grade retention, and
dropping out.”240 When states invest resources in initiatives like
smaller classes in high-poverty districts and competitive salaries, these states experience higher academic achievement for
disadvantaged children and a smaller achievement gap between
disadvantaged students and their more affluent peers.241 In addition, some research has found that teacher qualifications can
exert more influence on achievement than the race of a child or
their parents’ education.242
Given the influential nature of teachers on student learning,
the equitable distribution of effective teachers works in synergy
with the other building blocks of my model. For instance, equitably distributing effective teachers is dependent on fair funding
that appropriately recognizes the additional challenges teachers
face in struggling communities. Teachers also will be reluctant
to teach and remain in resource-starved working environments.
Families will not choose to send their children to schools with
low-quality teachers, and thus, integration is dependent on
teachers being equitably distributed.

238. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 90 (citation omitted); Roger D.
Goddard & Wayne K. Hoy, Collective Teacher Efficacy: Its Meaning, Measure,
and Impact on Student Achievement, 37 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 479, 479 (2000) (finding that “collective teacher efficacy was positively associated with differences
between schools in student-level achievement in both reading and mathematics”); see also Lindsay Clare Matsumura et al., Measuring Instructional Quality
in Accountability Systems: Classroom Assignments and Student Achievement, 8
EDUC. ASSESSMENT 207, 226–27 (2002) (finding that for secondary students
“higher quality teachers’ assignments were associated with higher quality student work” and that “the quality of teachers’ assignments predicted students’
scores on the reading and language portions of the Stanford 9, even after controlling for students’ backgrounds and prior level of achievement”).
239. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 233, at 1-29.
240. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 89.
241. See BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., MIND THE GAP: 20 YEARS OF PROGRESS AND
RETRENCHMENT IN SCHOOL FUNDING AND ACHIEVEMENT GAPS, EDUCATIONAL
TESTING SERVICE RESEARCH REPORT NO. RR-16-15 at 27–28 (2016).
242. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 87.
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2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge
Despite its requirement that states must ensure that lowincome and minority students are not disproportionately taught
by inexperienced, out-of-field, or ineffective teachers,243 ESSA
will not have a significant impact on the equitable distribution
of effective teachers for several reasons. Research and data confirm that the quality and qualifications of teachers remain inequitably distributed in spite of the No Child Left Behind requirement that states ensure that inexperienced, out-of-field, or
ineffective teachers do not disproportionately teach disadvantaged and minority students and that state plans identify how
states will evaluate and report to the public progress on achieving this goal.244 A DOE study of teacher quality found that although the overwhelming majority of teachers were highly qualified by 2006–07, teachers who were not highly qualified were
more likely to teach in a high-poverty school than a low-poverty
school (5% of teachers not highly qualified versus 1% respectively), and more likely to teach in a school with more than 75%
minority students than a school with less than 25% minority students (4% of teachers not highly qualified versus 1% respectively).245 Even among highly qualified teachers, high-poverty
schools were significantly more likely to employ teachers with
less than three years of experience (14% of teachers with less
than three years of experience versus 8% respectively), and such
teachers were more than twice as likely to teach in a school with
more than 75% minority students than a school with less than
25% minority students (15% of teachers with less than three
years of experience versus 7% respectively).246 Highly qualified
secondary teachers of English and math were less likely to possess a degree in the field if they taught in high-poverty schools
than in low-poverty schools (40% versus 59%), while the percentages of such teachers in high- and low-minority schools was comparable.247 ESSA retains and does not make improvements to
243. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(1)(B) (2016).
244. Id.
245. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT, VOLUME VIII—TEACHER QUALITY UNDER NCLB:
FINAL REPORT 51 (2009), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/teaching/nclb
-final/report.pdf. This report generally defined a high-poverty school as a school
with 75% or more students in poverty based on Census data and a low-poverty
school as one in which less than 25% of students were living in poverty. See id.
at app. A 149.
246. See id. at 53.
247. See id. at 53–54.
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the No Child Left Behind requirements on the distribution of
teachers that have allowed these disparities to persist.
When the DOE possessed real power to hold states accountable for compliance under No Child Left Behind, it paid minimal
attention to the requirement that disadvantaged and minority
students should not be disproportionately taught by unqualified
teachers.248 Early implementation efforts did not require states
to address this requirement and instead emphasized accountability and assessment requirements.249 Despite the fact that it
contradicted No Child Left Behind, DOE did not require states
to report the percentage of highly qualified teachers in schools
with low concentrations of poverty. This allowed states to mask
differences in teacher quality between high- and low- poverty
schools because these differences are typically larger than the
difference between the state averages and high-poverty
schools.250
In addition, the ESSA requirement that poor and minority
students must not disproportionately be taught by inexperienced, ineffective, and out-of-field teachers lacks an accountability provision to ensure enforcement.251 Given the fact that DOE
did not enforce this provision under No Child Left Behind and
the many limits on the Secretary of Education’s authority to enforce ESSA, the hands-off approach of ESSA is unlikely to spark
significant state reform. In addition, ESSA notes that states are
not required “to develop or implement a teacher, principal, or
other school leader evaluation system.”252 This caveat suggests
that states should rely on existing teacher evaluation systems to
define an “ineffective” and “inexperienced” teacher despite the
fact that these systems may not have been designed to assist in
fostering the equitable distribution of effective and experienced
teachers. States determine how an ineffective and inexperienced
teacher is defined,253 and thus, they have the flexibility to set a
low bar for teacher effectiveness, just as they set low standards
for a highly qualified teacher under No Child Left Behind.254
Furthermore, the requirement to report the qualifications of
248. See GAIL L. SUNDERMAN & JIMMY KIM, TEACHER QUALITY: EQUALIZING
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND OUTCOMES 26 (2005).
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. Aldeman, supra note 5, at 92.
252. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(1)(B) (2016).
253. See Jochim, supra note 132, at 131.
254. BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE COURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED
EDUCATION REFORM 52 (2008).
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teachers based on school poverty will only lead to impactful reforms to the extent that local constituents have the ability to
hold districts accountable for redistributing teachers. Thus, like
the requirement to publish per-pupil spending, the impact of this
provision will be circumscribed by the limited influence of socioeconomically disadvantaged and minority local constituents.
ESSA also requires that teachers be state certified.255 Since
all states already have a certification system, this minimal requirement allows states to decide not to improve teacher quality
at all. This approach retains some of the same flaws of No Child
Left Behind’s highly qualified teacher requirement because it
similarly establishes a low standard to qualify as a teacher. No
Child Left Behind required teachers to possess a bachelor’s degree, state certification and subject matter knowledge.256 The
highly qualified teacher requirement did have some positive impacts. More content-focused professional development was provided to teachers in elementary schools with high concentrations
of disadvantaged and minority students.257 Principals reported
an increase in firing or transferring teachers who were not
highly qualified during No Child Left Behind implementation,
with principals at high-poverty schools, high-minority schools,
and schools selected for improvement reporting a greater likelihood of teacher firing or transfer.258 Research also confirms that
the percentage of teachers who were highly qualified increased
in the years following No Child Left Behind.259
However, No Child Left Behind’s highly qualified teacher
requirements did not significantly raise the bar for teacher quality beyond the same basic teacher qualification standards that
had been around for decades.260 Many state and district officials
have confirmed that the No Child Left Behind highly qualified
requirements had little to no impact on teacher effectiveness.261
255. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(ix)(III) (2016); Black, supra note 3, at
1336.
256. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a)(1), 7801(23)(A–C) (2012) (repealed 2015).
257. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 245, at xxx.
258. See id. at xxvii–xxviii.
259. A review of data by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) found
that 84.5% of teachers possessed a bachelor’s degree and state certification before No Child Left Behind was passed and that a steady increase in the number
of highly qualified teachers was found with 96.7% of teachers meeting the requirement by 2009–10. See JEFFREY J. KUENZI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
TEACHER QUALITY ISSUES IN THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
ACT 10–11 (2012).
260. Rebell, supra note 216, at 69.
261. See JENNIFER MCMURRER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE
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Defining high quality with such a low bar does not address the
many ways that students in high-poverty and high-minority
schools are disadvantaged by disparities in teachers’ experience,
test scores, subject matter knowledge, out-of-field teaching and
pedagogical training.262 In fact, DOE itself acknowledged in a
2009 report on teacher quality under No Child Left Behind that
“the designation of being highly qualified is not a guarantee that
students will be taught by teachers with similar skills and
knowledge, and the differences among teachers continued to disadvantage the students who were most in need.”263 Instead, inequities endured in the distribution of teacher qualifications,
such as experience and course preparation, even when teachers
satisfied the highly qualified teacher requirements.264
Furthermore, DOE did not enforce the highly qualified
teacher provision, even when the Secretary had real authority to
enforce the law against recalcitrant states, just as it did not enforce the requirement to not disproportionately burden disadvantaged and minority students with less qualified teachers.265
Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings acknowledged in a
July 2007 letter that the 2005–06 highly qualified teacher deadline passed without a single state meeting it.266 She also provided greater flexibility beyond 2007 for state compliance.267 Ultimately, “the existence of plans, improved data collection, and
detectable progress toward meeting the highly qualified teacher
goal, rather than accomplishing the goal itself, became the department’s expectation.”268 Therefore, there is no reason to think

NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND TEACHER REQUIREMENTS 1 (2007) (“More than onethird (38%) of responding states and almost three-quarters (74%) of districts
reported that these requirements have had minimal or no impact on the effectiveness of the teacher workforce. Only 8% of states and 6% of districts said that
these requirements have improved teacher effectiveness to a great extent.”).
262. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 233, at 1-22–1-22; Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 87.
263. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 245, at 59.
264. See id. at 53, 140; see also MANNA, supra note 151, at 102–05; Michael
A. Rebell & Molly A. Hunter, “Highly Qualified” Teachers: Pretense or Legal
Requirement?, 85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 690, 691 (2004). The CRS data showed a
smaller gap on the percentage of highly qualified teachers in high- and lowpoverty schools. See KUENZI, supra note 259, at 10.
265. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 58.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See id.

958

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:915

that ESSA’s limited provisions to improve the quality and distribution of teachers will bring about meaningful change in teacher
quality.
An early analysis of the implementation of ESSA’s requirements on teacher quality indicates that states are not planning
to implement these requirements in ways that will drive equity.
The National Council on Teacher Quality’s review of the ESSA
plans for fifty states and the District of Columbia found that
states have mostly evaded their obligation to adopt strong accountability plans for ensuring that students of color and lowincome students receive equitable opportunities to be educated
by strong teachers.269 Thirty-five states do not publicly report
data that assesses whether low-income and minority students
are disproportionately taught by ineffective, out-of-field, or inexperienced teachers.270 To eliminate teacher equity gaps, states
need to provide clear and purposeful timelines and goals for ending equity gaps. However, only seven states provide this information.271 This review indicates that additional federal efforts
are needed beyond ESSA for states to make firm commitments
to teacher equity.
C. HIGH QUALITY PREK-12 OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN
The opportunity to learn encompasses a broad array of educational experiences, including exposure to a rigorous curriculum, the instructional materials needed to deliver the curriculum, facilities that support student engagement, and strong
extracurricular offerings.272 The opportunity to learn also includes the supports students need to reach their full potential,
such as effective guidance counselors and tutors.273 To understand why providing high-quality preK-12 opportunities to learn
is critical for closing the opportunity gap, it is essential to recognize that standards measuring the opportunity to learn were a
key component of the standards and accountability movement.274 Opportunity to learn standards were introduced with
content standards to ensure that students receive equal access
269. Ross, supra note 157.
270. ELIZABETH ROSS ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 2017
STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK: NATIONAL SUMMARY 4 (2017).
271. See Ross, supra note 157.
272. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39–42.
273. See id.
274. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 6, at 73–74. For further analysis of
how opportunity to learn standards could be developed and prove politically feasible, see Robinson, supra note 50, at 988–97.
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to the resources that they need to successfully learn the content
of challenging academic standards.275 However, the avenues for
states to adopt opportunity to learn standards included in Goals
2000276 and the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994277 were
repealed once a Republican majority took control of Congress.278
Under both Goals 2000 and the Improving America’s
Schools Act, state opportunity to learn standards were voluntary
and “states had little appetite to tackle inequitable resource issues.”279 State resistance to addressing inequities in the opportunity to learn remains as strong now as it was then.280 Even
with the growing abundance of data that reveals inequities in
the distribution of school resources, states rarely address these
inequities in a comprehensive fashion.281 Yet, oftentimes what
you measure is what matters,282 so the rationale behind measuring opportunity to learn remains sound.
Today, many minority and disadvantaged students receive
opportunities to learn that are significantly inferior in quality to
the opportunities that are provided to their peers.283 This occurs
in substantial part due to the widespread nature of inequitable
funding practices discussed in Part II.A. This Section highlights
some of the important opportunity gaps. It then analyzes why
ESSA is not structured to ensure equitable access to high-quality
opportunities to learn.

275. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 224, at 73–74.
276. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act § 212, 213(c)–(d) (1994). Goals
2000 allowed states to develop their own opportunity to learn standards and it
created the National Education Standards and Improvement Council to write
voluntary opportunity to learn standards for states. Id.
277. See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
§ 1111(b)(8), 108 Stat. 3518, 3523 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20 U.S.C.). The Improving America’s Schools Act required states to explain how
they would assist schools and districts in developing the capacity to enable students to achieve high standards, which could include opportunity to learn standards. Id.
278. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 992–93 (summarizing the federal legislation that included opportunity to learn standards).
279. See Brown, supra note 23, at 159.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 165.
282. See Welner & Carter, supra note 33, at 2–4 (explaining that the emphasis on measuring and remedying achievement gaps has overlooked the need to
close educational opportunity gaps).
283. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5, 9.
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1. The Challenge of Disparities in PreK-12 Opportunities to
Learn and Why It Matters
The opportunity gap begins very early in the lives of children in the United States.284 For instance, a collaborative study
of the opportunity gap by leading scholars led by Robert D. Putnam noted such profound differences as:
Rich kids enter kindergarten over a full year ahead of bottom-third
kids, having had almost 1400 more hours of developmental time with
their parents (think Good Night Moon or paddy cake time), having experienced more personalized daycare or the presence of stay-at-home
moms, having received $5,700 more of annual parental expenditures
on categories like musical instruments or books or summer camp or
trips to Paris, and having heard 30 million more words than their
poorer counterparts.285

Most developed countries invest more in children under five
than the United States.286 Despite compelling evidence of the
benefits of high-quality early childhood education, in the great
majority of states within the United States, disadvantaged and
minority children are significantly less likely to attend early
childhood education programs than their peers.287
Disparities in educational opportunity among children from
different socioeconomic backgrounds and racial groups continue
throughout their elementary and secondary education. Public
schools are exacerbating the challenges that disadvantaged and
minority students bring to classrooms by giving them less of the
essential tools that are needed to succeed.288 For instance,
schools serving higher concentrations of poor and minority students (except Asian students) have less access to advanced and
gifted course offerings and college preparatory curricula than
schools serving mostly white and middle class students.289 Students in poor schools often lack access to foreign language
284. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 24.
285. See id. at 4.
286. See id. at 24–25.
287. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 23; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER
OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 5 (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/
early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf. For benefits of high-quality care, see Meredith J. Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, 2015 UTAH L. REV.
659, 679–84 (2015); Meredith J. Harbach, Nudging Parents, 19 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 73, 78–81 (2016).
288. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 14.
289. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., HIGHER EDUCATION:
GAPS IN ACCESS AND PERSISTENCE STUDY 45 (2012), https://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2012/2012046.pdf; CHRISTINA THEOKAS & REID SAARIS, FINDING AMERICA’S MISSING AP AND IB STUDENTS 3–4 (2013), https://edtrust.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/10/Missing_Students.pdf (“Low-income students (15 percent)
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courses in high school, while wealthier schools oftentimes offer
these courses in elementary school.290 A study of opportunities
to learn across all fifty states found that approximately one-third
or more of low-income and most minority students attend lowperforming, poorly-resourced schools while 15% of white students and 21% of Asian American students attend such
schools.291 This rate of attendance at substandard schools is too
high for all subgroups, but particularly egregious for poor and
most minority communities.
Many low-income and minority students are educated in
schools with instructional materials, technology, and essential
facilities that are of lower quality than those of their peers.292
More minority and low-income children attend school in buildings of substandard physical quality than their white and more
affluent peers.293 Research also confirms that students in substandard facilities perform below their peers who attend school
in more functional and newer buildings.294 Children from lowincome backgrounds also participate in fewer extracurricular activities.295 Small disadvantages in educational opportunity that
are repeated on an annual basis can compound and become influential gaps by the time children complete school.296
Disparities in learning opportunities that occur throughout
childhood influence lifelong outcomes. Cognitive, social, and
emotional skill deficits of young children are harbingers of adult
gaps in educational achievement and success in the labor market.297 Early disadvantages also make it more difficult to close
achievement gaps as the child matures.298 Therefore, childhood,

were almost twice as likely as other students (8 percent) to attend a school without the full complement of [Advanced Placement] courses. Similarly, AmericanIndian (18 percent) and black (15 percent) students were far more likely than
white (9 percent) students to have more limited course options.”).
290. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 90.
291. SCHOTT FOUND. FOR PUB. EDUC., LOST OPPORTUNITY: A 50 STATE REPORT ON THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 8 (2009).
292. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 4–5.
293. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., REVERSING THE CYCLE OF DETERIORATION IN THE NATION’S PUBLIC SCHOOL BUILDINGS 5 (2014).
294. See id.; Sapna Cheryan et al., Designing Classrooms to Maximize Student Achievement, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 4, 6 (2014).
295. See PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 176.
296. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 37.
297. See id. at 26.
298. See id. at 25.
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particularly early childhood, is an essential time to prevent educational inequalities.299
The good news is that early investments in children matter
a great deal because the brain development of children as well
as an array of skills, such as language, social-emotional, cognitive, and behavioral skills, are quite responsive in young children.300 New research is finding that investments at the earliest
ages—infants and toddlers—can help to prevent disparities in
achievement outcomes.301 Research confirms that early childhood is the most promising time to invest in children, with some
studies finding that early investments sometimes not only resulted in substantial impacts but also “paid for themselves several times over.”302 High-quality early childhood education can
help disadvantaged and minority children enter school more
ready to acquire the knowledge and skills provided in their
schools.303 High-quality early education also can improve high

299.
300.
301.
302.

See id. at 26.
See id. at 24.
See id. at 30.
Id. at 28; see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF
INVESTING IN HIGH-QUALITY PRESCHOOL: USING EARLY EDUCATION TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF STATES AND
THE NATION 25 (2006) (noting research that finds that every dollar invested in
preschool programs for disadvantaged students yields between $2 and $16 in
benefits); James J. Heckman, Schools, Skills, and Synapses, 46 ECON. INQUIRY
289, 314 (2008) (noting that social policy should be directed to investment in a
child’s early years and that late interventions are not as effective or efficient).
303. See FARAH Z. AHMAD & KATIE HAMM, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE
SCHOOL-READINESS GAP AND PRESCHOOL BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR 1
(2013) (noting the school readiness benefits of high-quality preschool for children of color); CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 28 (noting the
benefits of high-quality early childhood education, particularly for disadvantaged students); DIONNE DOBBINS ET AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., UNEQUAL ACCESS: BARRIERS TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION FOR BOYS OF
COLOR 6 (2016) (noting that high-quality early education reaps educational and
societal benefits for low-income children of color); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, HEAD START IMPACT STUDY FINAL REPORT xxxvi (2010) (finding that African American children who participated in Head Start beginning at age four reported improved relationships with
teachers, less inattentiveness, and fewer difficulties with peer interactions and
structured learning by the end of kindergarten); Heckman, supra note 302, at
310 fig.17 (finding higher graduation rates, fewer arrests, higher earnings and
less participation in welfare for adults who participated in the Perry Preschool
Program).
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school graduation rates, lower incarceration rates, improve outcomes in the labor market, and enhance health even when test
score gains dissipate over time.304
Research also establishes that high-quality opportunities to
learn in elementary and secondary school can improve student
outcomes and help to reduce achievement gaps between disadvantaged students and their peers as well as between minority
students and their peers. For instance, studies find that the
achievement of both minority and economically disadvantaged
students improves in small classes even though these children
are more likely to be in large classes.305 In addition, research
confirms that disadvantaged and minority students benefit academically from such inputs as expanded learning opportunities,
including after-school and summer programs, and adequate
structural facilities that provide sufficient lighting, air quality,
and heating.306 A study of achievement of minority children in
high-quality charter schools found that “providing high-quality
schools to children who live in low-quality environments can significantly increase their achievement.”307 In contrast, the study
found that improving the social environment in which the children were raised did not result in a significant increase in
achievement, and thus, it concluded that “it may not take a village to increase the achievement of the poorest minority students, just a high-quality school.”308
Disadvantaged and minority students benefit from access to
a robust and engaging curriculum that includes an early emphasis on math and literacy, incorporates higher order thinking, and

304. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 28; Heckman, supra note 302 (presenting evidence of long-term gains).
305. See WILLIAM J. MATHIS, RESEARCH-BASED OPTIONS FOR EDUCATION
POLICYMAKING: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLASS SIZE REDUCTION 1; see also Kenneth Leithwood & Doris Jantzi, A Review of Empirical Evidence About School
Size Effects: A Policy Perspective, 79 REV. EDUC. RES. 464, 470, 484 (2009)
(showing that socially and economically disadvantaged students benefit from
small schools).
306. See HOWARD T. EVERSON & ROGER E. MILLSAP, COLL. BD., EVERYONE
GAINS: EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES IN HIGH SCHOOL AND HIGHER SAT
SCORES 1 (2005); MARGO GARDNER ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, EQUITY MATTERS: RES. REV. NO. 4: CAN AFTER-SCHOOL PROGRAMS HELP LEVEL
THE ACADEMIC PLAYING FIELD FOR DISADVANTAGED YOUTH? 5 (2009); Cheryan
et al., supra note 294, at 9; Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff, Educational
Opportunity Is Achievable and Affordable, 93 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 62–63 (2012).
307. Vilsa E. Curto et al., It May Not Take a Village: Increasing Achievement
Among the Poor, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?, supra note 35, at 483, 486.
308. Id. at 486.
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embraces subjects like art, music, science and social studies.309
Extracurricular activities are essential because, even after controlling for the socioeconomic background of the child’s family,
these activities are associated with beneficial outcomes, such as
a “higher grade-point averages, lower dropout rates, lower truancy, better work habits, higher educational aspirations, lower
delinquency rates, greater self-esteem, more psychological resilience, less risky behavior, more civic engagement (like voting
and volunteering), and higher future wages and occupational attainment.”310 High-quality learning opportunities benefit all students, but they are particularly important for disadvantaged
students because they help to mitigate the adverse effects of poverty.
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge
ESSA will not provide sufficient incentives for most states
to close opportunity gaps for several reasons. ESSA requires districts with schools in the bottom 5% of the state to “identif[y]
resource inequities” that are “to be addressed through implementation of [the] comprehensive support and improvement
plan.”311 This provision is unlikely to guide districts to reduce
opportunity gaps. ESSA does not specify which resource inequities should or must be studied, thereby allowing districts to come
up with a relatively short list of resources to reduce their compliance burden. Although the provision notes that districts may
consider school level budgeting,312 even this basic metric is not
required in the identification of resource inequities. This provision will also overlook the larger inequalities between districts
within a state.313

309. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39; Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 89–91.
310. PUTNAM, supra note 222, at 174–75 (citations omitted); see also DEBORAH LOWE VANDELL ET AL., OUTCOMES LINKED TO HIGH-QUALITY AFTERSCHOOL PROGRAMS: LONGITUDINAL FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF PROMISING
AFTERSCHOOL PROGRAMS (2007), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED499113.pdf
(“A new study by researchers at the University of California, Irvine, the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Policy Studies Associates, Inc. finds that regular participation in high-quality afterschool programs is linked to significant
gains in standardized test scores and work habits as well as reductions in behavior problems among disadvantaged students.”).
311. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2016).
312. Id.
313. Black, supra note 3, at 1352–53 (noting that districts may even expand
funding inequalities and deficits).
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In addition, the provision is ambiguous about what “address” means. Anything from tinkering at the margins of inequities to eradicating them could fall within the definition of “address” because the provision does not specify that inequities
must be addressed in a meaningful and comprehensive manner.
Given that districts can claim compliance with minimal interventions, this provision is unlikely to yield significant reductions
in longstanding opportunity gaps. Most importantly, this provision will prove ineffective because the district that created and
tolerated the inequities is charged with addressing them. This
approach resembles the nation’s approach to school desegregation that left the remedy to those who created the harmful practice.314 That approach proved unsuccessful then315 and it is unlikely to work now.
ESSA also continues the central flaw in the standards and
accountability movement: it does not hold states, districts, and
schools accountable for providing unequal access to the highquality learning opportunities that would help to reduce achievement gaps.316 The educational opportunity gap between disadvantaged students and their more affluent peers fuels most of
the achievement gap.317 Yet, it is the achievement gap that receives the lion’s share of attention from ESSA with the limited
ineffectual exception noted above and the requirement regarding
the equitable distribution of teachers critiqued in Part II.B.2.
Furthermore, ESSA’s continued heavy emphasis on using
testing results to identify low-performing schools may help to
perpetuate inferior learning opportunities for students in disadvantaged and minority schools. Being identified as a school in
the bottom 5% of schools in a district or state is likely to have the
same impact that the label “in need of improvement” had on
314. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown:
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized
Segregated Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 798 (2010) (noting that Brown II
“placed those most invested in forestalling desegregation in charge of implementation”).
315. See id. at 800–04 (noting that southern districts adopted measures that
resulted in little to no desegregation).
316. See Black, supra note 3, at 1351–53; Welner & Carter, supra note 33,
at 4 (noting that the increase in high standards “never took the next crucial
step: holding policy makers accountable for ensuring the conditions and resources necessary to create and maintain a system of excellence that offers universal opportunity”).
317. Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Building Opportunities to
Achieve, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO, supra
note 32, at 217–19.
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schools under No Child Left Behind. Such schools were labeled
as failures and this label sometimes caused an array of negative
interventions, such as teaching to the test and repetitive practice
tests that rely on memorization rather than a deep understanding of course material.318 Given that many high-poverty and
high-minority schools will be the schools that are identified, this
approach can deprive these students of a much-needed rich curriculum that embraces higher order thinking and a range of academic subjects beyond math and reading, including art and music.319 In addition, the continued heavy emphasis on test results
can cause schools to devalue the importance of other activities
that improve outcomes for children, such as extracurricular activities that can increase graduation rates and help students
learn teamwork, interpersonal communication, and grit.320
ESSA’s ineffectual approaches to funding and the equitable distribution of teachers also will permit states and districts to maintain the funding and teacher distribution practices that exacerbate opportunity gaps. For these reasons, ESSA will not
effectively guide states in closing longstanding opportunity gaps.
D. ECONOMIC AND RACIAL INTEGRATION
Substantial racial and economic isolation of students are
well-documented causes of the opportunity gap.321 Both concentrated poverty and racial isolation are growing within the public
schools in the United States.322 The challenges of economic segregation are often compounded by racial segregation.323 This
Section summarizes the research on the challenges that increasing socioeconomic and racial segregation cause and their impact
on student achievement. This Section then shows how ESSA
missed a critical opportunity to encourage states and districts to
promote integration.
318. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Evaluating No Child Left Behind: The
Problems and Promises of Bush’s Education Policy, NATION (May 2, 2007),
https://thenation.com/article/evaluating-no-child-left-behind/; Peter Schrag,
High Stakes Are for Tomatoes, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2000), http://theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2000/08/high-stakes-are-for-tomatoes/378306.
319. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 39.
320. See id. at 40.
321. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5; CLOSING THE
OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 38 (“American segregation is a problem because it leads to and reinforces inequalities in school quality and resources.”).
322. EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 38, at 18; GARY ORFIELD
ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY
RACE, POVERTY AND STATE 1 (2016).
323. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 13.
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1. The Challenge of Economic and Racial Segregation and
Why It Matters
Socioeconomic and racial segregation in schools are on the
rise in the United States. The percentage of public schools that
are both poor and predominantly African American or Hispanic
is increasing. These schools share a host of disadvantages, including fewer science, math, and college preparatory courses.324
As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights confirmed in its 2018
report: “[R]acial, ethnic, and economic segregation remain a reality all across the U.S.”325
These conditions exist today due in part to increasing poverty rates and the failure of law and policy to address increasing
racial and socioeconomic segregation. In 2015, one in five of the
approximately 73.6 million children under the age of eighteen
living in the United States lived in poverty, with children zero to
five experiencing the highest likelihood of living in poverty.326
Schools reflect this high poverty rate and are experiencing increasing poverty levels. While the average low-income public
school enrollment in 1993 was approximately 25%, by 2013 it
had risen to just over 50%.327 The average student from a lowincome background attended a school that was just over 50% students from low-income backgrounds in 1993, and by 2013 she or
he attended a school that was composed of approximately 67%
students from low-income backgrounds.328 The concentration of
poverty in schools has increased for all races, with African American students experiencing the greatest increase (31%) while
whites and Latinos also saw a dramatic increase (22%) over this
time period.329 By 2013, the average African American and Latino student attended a school that was about 68% low-income
students, while whites and Asians attended a school that was
40% low-income students.330
Concentrated poverty has an independent adverse impact
on student outcomes beyond the socioeconomic background of
324. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD
HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
(2016).
325. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5.
326. See FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 2017 viii, 14, 116
tbl.ECON1.A (2017).
327. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 7 fig.3.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
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the student.331 Concentrated poverty brings with it a host of educational challenges because it correlates with factors that increase the cost of successfully educating children, including
lower educational outcomes, racial isolation, homelessness, and
increased student mobility.332 In addition, schools of concentrated poverty often have less qualified and experienced teachers, fewer educational resources, a narrower curriculum taught
at a less rigorous level, and additional safety and health problems.333 Economic segregation also hinders teaching and learning because “remediation becomes the norm, and teachers have
little time to challenge the exceptional students who can overcome the personal, family, and community hardships that typically interfere with learning.”334 Economic segregation also reinforces school resource and quality inequalities.335
Racial segregation also has returned to many schools in the
United States. For instance, the percentage of African American
students in majority white schools peaked at 43.5% in 1988, but
by 2011, it had returned to 23.2%, which is almost the exact
same level that it was in 1968 when the Supreme Court announced that racially segregated schools had to convert to “just
schools.”336 Between 1988 and 2013, white students decreased in
their racial isolation while the percentage of schools that are
90% to 100% minority more than tripled from 5.7% to 18.4%.337
For the 2013–14 school year, in seventeen states, more than onethird of African American students attended schools that were
90% to 100% minority, with the highest rate for such attendance
at 65.8% in New York.338 For the same school year, in nine states
more than one-third of Latino students attended schools that
331. Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 82.
332. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 3; CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP,
supra note 1, at 38; Rothstein, supra note 169, at 61–69 (noting the educational
challenges associated with concentrated poverty).
333. Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 83.
334. Rothstein, supra note 169, at 64.
335. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY Gap, supra note 1, at 38.
336. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968); GARY
ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS,
A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 2, 10 (2014).
337. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 3.
338. Id. at 4–5 (listing the 17 states and the rate of African American attendance in schools that are 90% to 100% minority as follows: New York (65.8%),
Illinois (59.6%), Maryland (53.7%), New Jersey (49.2%), Michigan (48.7%), California (47.9%), Wisconsin (45.3%), Pennsylvania (45.3%), Mississippi (45.2),
Tennessee (44.3%), Texas (43.3%), Georgia (43.1%), Alabama (42.1%), Missouri
(41.4%), Ohio (37.8%), Florida (34.4%), and Louisiana (33.2%)).
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were 90% to 100% minority with the highest rate for such attendance at 56.8% in New York.339
In addition, just under two-thirds of all public school students in the United States attend schools where at least half of
their classmates share their race or ethnicity.340 Whites experience the highest rates of attending school with half of the students of the same race.341 In 2014, whites attended schools in
which more than half of the students were white at the rate of
81%, although this has decreased since 1995 when the rate for
whites was 90.5%.342 Further, 44.1% of black public elementary
and secondary school students attended schools where at least
half of their classmates also were black, and this rate also has
declined since 1995 when it was 51.4%.343 For Hispanic students,
56.7% attended schools in which more than half of their classmates also were Hispanic.344 This percentage has risen slightly
since 1995 when it was 52.6%.345
Racial segregation by race and class often occurs simultaneously with many African American and Hispanic students attending predominately poor schools while middle class students
predominate in the schools attended by many of their white and
Asian peers.346 Racial segregation brings with it a host of harmful effects, including providing inferior educational opportunities
and producing substandard educational outcomes, as I have

339. Id. at 6 (listing the nine states and the rate of Latino attendance in
schools that are 90% to 100% minority as follows: New York (56.8%), California
(56.5%), Texas (53.7%), Rhode Island (49.5%), Illinois (44.9%), New Jersey
(42.5%), Maryland (40.4%), Arizona (40.3%), and New Mexico (34.7%)).
340. ABIGAIL GEIGER, MANY MINORITY STUDENTS GO TO SCHOOLS WHERE
AT LEAST HALF OF THEIR PEERS ARE THEIR RACE OR ETHNICITY, PEW RES. CTR.
(Oct. 25, 2017), http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/25/many-minority
-students-go-to-schools-where-at-least-half-of-their-peers-are-their-race-or
-ethnicity/ft-17-10-24-raceeducation-nearlytwothirds.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON, NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, SCHOOL
INTEGRATION AND K-12 OUTCOMES: AN UPDATED QUICK SYNTHESIS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 1, 1 (2016); ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 336, at 2 (noting
White and Asian students typically attend middle class schools).
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summarized in past scholarship347 and as other research confirms.348
The good news is that increasing socioeconomic integration
and racial integration reaps important benefits for students. Research establishes that increasing socioeconomic integration to
create predominantly middle class schools can improve the academic achievement of disadvantaged students without reducing
the achievement of their middle-income peers as long as the
school remains majority middle class.349 When students from
low-income schools attend a middle class school, they can gain
several benefits. First, middle class peers are more academically
engaged and are less likely to be a behavioral challenge for
teachers.350 Middle class peers can help to socialize and prepare
other students for the environments that they will experience in
college.351 Middle class peers also can provide access to the relationships and opportunities that can lead to postsecondary success.352 Second, more effective teachers with higher expectations
teach in middle class schools.353 Third, middle class parents are
more involved in schools and are able to exert more influence
over school officials.354 Fortunately, socioeconomic integration

347. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 327–36 (2009) (citing Jomills Henry Braddock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828 (James A. Banks &
Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2004)); Janet Ward Schofield, Fostering Positive
Intergroup Relations in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, supra, at 799; Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on
Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (1998); Amy
Stuart Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the
Supreme Court’s Integration Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178 (2007).
348. See, e.g., MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 1; ORFIELD ET AL., supra note
336, at 37.
349. RYAN, supra note 27, at 273.
350. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Turnaround Schools and Charter Schools
That Work: Moving Beyond Separate but Equal, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY
283, 284 (2012) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION].
351. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 322, at 6 (highlighting that when lowincome students socialize only with other low-income students, they are less
prepared for college).
352. See id. at 6 (noting that when low-income students remain segregated,
they miss out on better opportunities associated with informal information and
contacts).
353. See Kahlenberg, supra note 350, at 286–87.
354. See id. at 286.
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can be a particularly cost effective strategy, with one study finding that the public return on investing in socio-economically integrated schools is three times its costs and the total return is
more than five times its costs.355 The only educational investment with a higher investment return is very high-quality early
childhood education, an intervention that is discussed in Part
II.C.356
Students also benefit from racial integration, although the
benefit of socioeconomic integration is larger for academic
achievement.357 For example, desegregation helped to reduce the
opportunity gaps for black and white students in the South in
teacher quality, class size, and per-pupil spending.358 Students
who attended a desegregated school performed at higher academic levels than students in segregated schools and the benefit
increased the earlier the student entered a desegregated
school.359 Students who attend racially integrated schools
demonstrate a reduction in racial prejudice and stereotypes, an
increase in interracial friendships, a more effective ability to
navigate multiracial settings, and a greater likelihood to live in
integrated neighborhoods.360 Students, particularly students of
color, in integrated schools also show such benefits as “development of critical thinking skills, higher graduation rates, more
prominent educational and career goals, greater earnings in the
workforce, and even more positive health outcomes.”361
Students from all racial groups and socioeconomic backgrounds benefit from diversity, but the largest gains are for mi-

355. See Marco Basile, The Cost-Effectiveness of Socioeconomic School Integration, in THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION, supra note 350, at 127, 128.
356. Richard D. Kahlenberg, From All Walks of Life: New Hope for School
Integration, AM. EDUCATOR 2, 7 (Winter 2012–13).
357. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 27, at 273; AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., CENTURY FOUND., HOW RACIALLY DIVERSE SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CAN BENEFIT ALL STUDENTS 12–15 (2016); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27,
at 5.
358. Sean F. Reardon & Ann Owens, 60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School Segregation, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 210–12 (2014).
359. JENNIFER AYSCUE ET AL., NAT’L COAL. ON SCH. DIVERSITY, THE COMPLEMENTARY BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN SCHOOLS
1–2 (2017); see also Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation & School Quality on Adult Attainments 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16664, 2011) (“Black cohorts with more school-age years of
desegregation exposure have higher completed years of education than unexposed cohorts and cohorts with fewer years of exposure.”).
360. See MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 4.
361. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 5.
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nority students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.362 Furthermore, it is important to understand that although the gains from socioeconomic and racial diversity overlay,
each type of diversity provides “unique effects for learners.”363
Therefore, both socioeconomic and racial integration should remain the aims of policy rather than solely focusing on one of
these goals.
2. Why ESSA Will Fail to Meet This Challenge
The U.S. Department of Education supports a handful of
small grant programs that include economic and racial integration among their goals. For instance, the oldest and largest support for integration is the Magnet Schools Assistance Program,
which aims to bring together students from different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.364 In fiscal year 2017, DOE
awarded $91.7 million to thirty-two grantees in sixteen states,365
which was down from the $104 million offered in fiscal year
2009.366 This program reaches over 2.5 million students.367
ESSA will increase funding for magnet schools to $108 million
by fiscal year 2020.368
362. See MICKELSON, supra note 346, at 2.
363. Id.; see Reyn van Ewijk & Peter Sleegers, The Effect of Peer Socioeconomic Status on Student Achievement: A Meta-Analysis, 5 EDUC. RES. REV. 134
(2010); Susan E. Mayer, How Much Does a High School’s Racial and Socioeconomic Mix Affect Graduation and Teenage Fertility Rates?, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 321 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991); Gregory J.
Palardy, High School Socioeconomic Segregation and Student Attainment, 50
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 714 (2013).
364. See 20 U.S.C. § 7231 (2016).
365. Office of Innovation & Improvement, Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP), What’s New, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/what
-we-do/parental-options/magnet-school-assistance-program-msap (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
366. Office of Innovation & Improvement, Magnet Schools Assistance Program (MSAP), Funding and Legislation, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://innovation
.ed.gov/what-we-do/parental-options/magnet-school-assistance-program-msap/
funding-and-legislation (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
367. See id.
368. 20 U.S.C. § 7231j (2016). In 2016, the Department of Education announced that the new “Opening Doors, Expanding Opportunities” grant would
offer $12 million for up to twenty districts or consortia of districts to increase
socioeconomic diversity and raise academic achievement. U.S. Education Secretary Announces Grant Competitions to Encourage Diverse Schools, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-education
-secretary-announces-grant-competitions-encourage-diverse-schools. Grantees
were permitted to include racial and ethnic integration among their goals. Id.
However, the Trump administration discontinued this program in 2017. Emma
Brown, Trump’s Education Department Nixes Obama-Era Grant Program for
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Although ESSA did not highlight integration of schools as a
policy priority,369 ESSA included modest requirements to
strengthen the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, including
requiring grant applicants to note their evidence or rationale for
how the magnet school will improve integration.370 Grantees also
must show how they will measure and assess the impact of integration activities on student achievement.371 Grantees may now
use the funds to create inter-district or regional magnet programs.372 ESSA also allows grant funds to be used to support
transportation costs if the transportation is sustainable beyond
the grant and is not a substantial portion of the grant funds.373
Despite these modest improvements, the very small allocation
for the Magnet Schools Assistance Program will make magnet
schools a low to nonexistent policy priority for most districts and
states. States and districts that choose to implement socioeconomic and racial integration programs will do so solely because
it is a state or local priority rather than a federal one.374
The failure to include socioeconomic and racial integration
as a policy priority within ESSA is a valuable missed opportunity. Socioeconomic integration provides a cost-effective approach to improving student outcomes while not harming the
School Diversity, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://washingtonpost.com/
news/education/wp/2017/03/29/trumps-education-department-nixes-obama-era
-grant-program-for-school-diversity. Other grant programs that support economic integration include the Education Innovation and Research program and
the Charter Schools program. See Charter Schools Program Grants for Replication and Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://
innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/charter-schools/charter-schools-program-grants
-for-replications-and-expansion-of-high-quality-charter-schools (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018) (noting the program’s aim to provide financial assistance for planning, design, and implementation of high-quality public charter schools); Education Innovation and Research, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/
what-we-do/innovation/education-innovation-and-research-eir (noting the program’s aim to provide funding to support high-need students). Economic integration is merely one possible goal of grantees for these programs.
369. Christopher A. Suarez, Reducing Socioeconomic Isolation Through
School Innovation Grants, 3 EDUC. L & POL’Y REV. 90, 92 (2016).
370. Id. at 92–93.
371. Id. at 93.
372. See id.
373. 20 U.S.C. § 7231f(a)(9) (2016).
374. Magnet school grantees also must develop magnet schools in light of the
research about the challenges that such schools face. For example, magnet
schools that are not Title I schools, magnet schools under desegregation plans,
and rural magnet schools enjoy greater success in reducing minority group isolation than other magnet schools. MANYA WALTON & ELIZABETH FORD, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., MAGNET SCHOOLS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: GRANTEE DATA
ANALYSIS REPORT 37 (2014).
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achievement of middle class students.375 Therefore, this reform
warrants inclusion within federal education priorities as reformers search for affordable school reforms. These benefits stand in
sharp contrast to the many adverse effects of the standards and
accountability movement that remain the centerpiece of ESSA,
including teaching to the test, testing limited levels of
knowledge, and the narrowing of the curriculum to name a few
of the adverse effects of this approach under No Child Left Behind.376 Similarly, racial integration brings benefits that other
reforms cannot, including teaching students to work with those
unlike themselves and reducing stereotypes.377 The United
States cannot rely on states to urge districts to promote class and
race integration.378 Therefore, the federal government must take
the lead on pursuing these critical policy objectives.
In the next Section, I propose how Congress should restructure ESEA to advance educational equity.
III. RESTRUCTURING ESEA’S APPROACH TO EQUITY
Although state chief school officers have signed a statement
supporting equity, early reviews of state plans reveal a minimal
commitment to equity by many states and indicate that it will
take much more than a state-initiated statement supporting equity to ensure equitable access to excellent educational opportunities for all students.379 Federal leadership is essential to support and incentivize states to meet the needs of disadvantaged
students.380 Further evidence of the need for federal leadership
can be found in the fact that the Council of Chief State School
Officers opposed the proposed regulatory revisions to the supplement-not-supplant requirement that would have required districts to spend the same funds, including teacher salaries, on Title I and non-Title I schools.381 If the states are in fact committed
to equity in funding, this provision could have been, and arguably should have been, merely the start of an effort to advance
educational equity. Instead, civil rights advocates championed
375. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 273.
376. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 110–11, 117.
377. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 273–74.
378. See id. at 274.
379. See USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 2.
380. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 28 (“[T]o reduce achievement gaps
both within and among states, an effective federal policy is needed to boost investments in states to reduce interstate inequality while encouraging states
with unrealized capacity to do more to address their own shortfalls.”).
381. Klein, supra note 205.
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the need to give meaning to this toothless requirement and the
states opposed it, citing compliance challenges and potential adverse consequences such as forced teacher transfers.382
However, ESSA has sparked some positive reforms and federal efforts to advance equity can build on those efforts. For example, when permitted to select an additional indicator of school
performance, at least thirty-five states are assessing college and
career readiness, including SAT and ACT scores, and access to
and passage of International Baccalaureate and Advanced
Placement courses.383 Many states also are assessing if students
are on track in middle and high school, which can help to prevent
students from lagging behind or dropping out.384 State inclusion
of these measures begins a process that can be nurtured to expand the opportunity to learn and to increase graduation rates.
As I explain below, the federal government should leverage
and expand upon the $550 billion that it spends on public education annually385 to create a supportive partnership with states
that are seeking to meet the needs of all students. It also should
incentivize states that are merely paying lip service to equity
goals to implement sustained and comprehensive reforms. The
regular reauthorization of ESEA provides lawmakers, advocates, and the American people the opportunity to reexamine
and restructure how they want to achieve equity.
Other scholars have provided an array of recommendations
for reforming ESEA,386 including Title I.387 In this Part, I build
upon this body of work while emphasizing the incremental approach that I recently proposed in No Quick Fix for Equity and
Excellence: The Virtues of Incremental Shifts in Education Federalism.388 In contrast to other scholars that typically propose a
single reform or an array of reforms to be implemented in a single piece of legislation or policymaking, in No Quick Fix I argue
382. See id.
383. See Klein et al., supra note 139.
384. See USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 4.
385. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 6.
386. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 159–63; MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA
R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD AHEAD: FROM NCLB HYPE TO MEANINGFUL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 9–81 (2008).
387. See, e.g., Black, Leveraging Funding, supra note 60, at 241–47; Cassandra J. Havard, Funny Money: How Federal Education Funding Hurts Poor and
Minority Students, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 123, 127 (2009); Paul T. Hill,
Rethinking the Federal Role in Elementary and Secondary Education, in THE
FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
46, 49 (2001); Liu, supra note 199, at 1011–12.
388. Robinson, supra note 49, at 201.
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that the backlash against the significant shift to education federalism embraced in No Child Left Behind should teach us that
the nation will not embrace reforms that result in quick and radical shifts to education federalism.389 Instead, a more effective
approach would incrementally build toward the ultimate law
and policymaking goal of equitable access to an excellent education.390
In No Quick Fix, I proposed that the United States implement three types of reforms that could lead to comprehensive
restructuring of education funding systems: inviting incentives,
compelling (but not coercive) conditions, and meaningful mandates.391 Here, I translate my lessons for school funding to inform adoption of my model for an institutional approach to equity that would prepare for and ultimately reauthorize ESEA. I
recommend federal incentives and conditions that together provide a more powerful and ultimately sustainable engine for
change than any one of these strategies alone. I also briefly consider when mandates might be employed to provide a long-term
national commitment to norms and policymaking objectives that
prove successful under ESEA.
Fundamentally, my recommendations acknowledge that the
United States must change not just specific laws and policies but
ultimately the nation’s approach to education federalism.392
Without a foundational change to education federalism, reforms
that advance equitable access to an excellent education will continue to be sacrificed at the altar of state and local control. With
incremental shifts to education federalism undergirding reform,
the United States can enact policies that move the nation towards greater equality and quality of educational opportunities
for all students. My proposal for reforming education federalism
seeks to establish a more collaborative federal-state partnership
for education that expands state capacity for reform while drawing upon federal policymaking strengths. The nature of the federal-state partnership will vary in part depending on the capacity of a state to enact reform and its need for federal support and
expertise.
Although some might question why this Article recommends
reforms at the federal level at a time when the federal govern-

389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at 242–49.
See id.
Id. at 220–37.
See Robinson, supra note 50, at 983–85.
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ment has shifted toward greater state and local control of education, focusing on federal reforms makes sense given the federal
government’s superior track record for enacting reforms that
promote equal opportunity as compared to the states. This track
record has been established through an array of federal education laws, including Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, and Pell Grants under the Higher
Education Act of 1965, to name a few.393
My recommendations for reforming ESEA move beyond my
framework in No Quick Fix in three important ways. First, my
current focus is on how the United States should restructure its
approach to reauthorizing ESEA. ESEA often includes untested
reforms that are sharply criticized when they prove ineffective.
My recommendations reveal that an effectual and impactful
ESEA depends upon testing potential ESEA reforms before they
serve as conditions for federal education funds. Second, while No
Quick Fix focused on a long-term agenda for moving toward equitable funding, this article applies this framework to four critical education building blocks that would work synergistically
within ESEA to achieve equity. Finally, my recommendations for
reforming ESEA are calibrated to each specific building block by
analyzing the current state of research on these building blocks
and anticipating potential obstacles to incorporating each building block into ESEA, including practical and political obstacles.
Therefore, this Article provides novel insights to guide future
reauthorizations of ESEA, bolstering the concepts introduced in
No Quick Fix with practical implementation and sustainability
measures.
Section A describes the components of my incremental approach and why I believe it represents a superior approach for
the type of comprehensive education reform that restructuring
ESEA will require. Sections B through E explore how this ap393. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 1070); Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400–1409 (2012)); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688
(2012)); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87
Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); see also Barone &
DeBray, supra note 6, at 61, 63; Brown, supra note 23, at 165; Robinson, supra
note 50, at 1005, 1015–16. For further details on my proposed reforms for restructuring education federalism, please see Robinson, supra note 50, at 983–
1005.
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proach could be applied to federal incentive grants and reauthorization of ESEA to ensure that states provide the essential building blocks for educational equity that are discussed in Part II,
including fair funding, an equitable distribution of effective
teachers, high-quality preK-12 opportunities to learn, and economic and racial integration.
A. NO QUICK FIX
Before summarizing how incentives and conditions (with a
limited discussion of future mandates) could be employed to support a reauthorization of ESEA that effectively advances equity,
it is crucial to understand that each reform is intended to inform
the structure of the preceding reform.394 For example, new conditions in ESEA should build upon lessons learned from federal
incentives that aim to achieve the same policymaking objective.
Thus, my recommendations are preliminary in nature because it
is difficult to predict the impact of, and response to, the preceding reform. However, it is important to consider the full array of
potential reforms so that a comprehensive, long-term solution is
designed, rather than a one-time solution that falls short of its
goals.395
1. Inviting Incentives
Incentives offer federal support and funding to encourage
states to consider adopting preferred policy approaches.396 Even
before such incentives are adopted, the federal government must
make the case to the American people that reform is needed.397
Once the need for reform is explained, federal incentives send a
signal that the federal government is prioritizing a preferred reform within its policymaking agenda, while not insisting that
states implement particular reforms. The expressive function of
incentives highlights a change in the federal approach to education reform that is less threatening than conditions and mandates and thus can encourage state and local cooperation.398
Federal incentives can take several forms. Incentives for reform should begin by offering research and technical assistance
that support state efforts to adopt equitable reforms.399 Research
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See Robinson, supra note 49, at 221.
See id.
See id. at 221–22.
See id. at 221.
See id.
See id. at 222.
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and technical support can help states avoid approaches that
have proven unsuccessful and concentrate on promising or
proven reforms. Research and technical assistance help to expand the capacity of both state departments of education and local school districts, which have sometimes struggled to support
effective reform, as evidenced with implementation of No Child
Left Behind.400 The initial implementation of ESSA also is confirming that states continue to lack the capacity to drive reform.401 In a survey of forty-five states regarding ESSA implementation, all but one state indicated that the state lacked
capacity to fulfill one or more requirement.402
As discussed in greater detail below, federal incentives
should include grants to help states and districts assess the nature of specific barriers to opportunity and to reward innovative
and impactful state and district practices.403 Such grants also
spark additional dialogue about why reforms are needed and the
potential avenues for reform.404 In a state survey on ESSA implementation, some states noted that they lack sufficient funding to implement ESSA.405 Federal incentives in the form of
grants can help to fill this gap in state funding in ways that expand states’ capacity and thereby empower states to undertake
comprehensive reform.
The Race to the Top (RTTT) initiative demonstrated that
federal incentives can provide a powerful carrot that entices
states to adopt desired reforms.406 Given that some states have
begun to pull back from reforms adopted when they hoped to secure RTTT funds that ultimately were not forthcoming, future
federal incentives should build on the lessons learned from
RTTT. For example, future federal incentives should provide
technical assistance on how to write a successful grant application and ensure that the program has the ability to reward any
400. See id.
401. See USHOMIRSKY ET AL., supra note 154, at 9.
402. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, STATES REFLECT ON YEAR ONE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESSA 1 (2017).
403. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 222–23.
404. See id. at 223.
405. CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, supra note 402, at 1.
406. Patrick McGuinn, Stimulating Reform: Race to the Top, Competitive
Grants and the Obama Education Agenda, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 136, 143–47 (2012).
But see Henig et al., supra note 90, at 29, 37–38 (arguing that “RTTT’s actual
impact on state policy is difficult to determine” because some studies show significant adoption of the preferred policies but it is unclear which of the policies
would have been adopted in the absence of RTTT and some states may not sustain the adopted changes).
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state that demonstrates a strong commitment to lasting equity
reforms.407 Furthermore, future federal incentives should be distributed over several years with benchmarks established for the
receipt of future funds rather than a one-time grant award. This
can help to ensure that states follow through with the plans in
grant applications.408 Federal incentives should remain in place,
even if federal conditions are adopted to provide ongoing encouragement for state investments in reform.409
Incentive grants should use DOE’s discretionary funding,
rather than funds authorized under ESEA. RTTT resulted from
$4.35 billion that Congress provided to DOE for “state incentive
grants.”410 This type of discretionary spending gives the Department greater authority to initiate reform efforts without getting
mired in the types of political battles that kept ESEA from being
reauthorized for more than seven years.411 Employing discretionary funding also allows the Department greater flexibility to
adjust the conditions of grant programs for subsequent years in
response to research regarding the effectiveness of a program.
One might appropriately question what federal incentives
have to do with reforming ESEA given that it is a conditional
spending program. Federal incentives through discretionary
spending can encourage the laboratory of the states to try reforms before they are included as federal conditions for the entire nation through ESEA. If this approach had been adopted for
the accountability and school sanction approaches in No Child
Left Behind, perhaps the nation could have avoided the perverse
incentives of the law that led states to lower standards and cut
scores and teachers to teach to standardized tests.412 Rather
than implement innovative reforms through ESEA that require
the entire nation to test the reform at the same time, a robust
system of federal incentives that precedes reauthorization could
help the federal and state governments enter a partnership. In
this way, states can assess which reforms deserve to be conditions within ESEA and which should be left behind because they
are ill-conceived, ineffective, infeasible, or too costly. Even as the
nation waits to see the impact of greater state and local control
407. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 223–24.
408. See id. at 224–25.
409. See id. at 225.
410. McGuinn, supra note 406, at 139.
411. Cf. Klein, supra note 17, at 43 (detailing the arduous political process
behind the passage of the ESSA).
412. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 944–59, 973.
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over education under ESSA, the federal government should continue to encourage experimentation through an ongoing program of federal incentives for promising equity reforms that
could be implemented in future ESEA reauthorizations.
2. Compelling (But Not Unconstitutionally Coercive)
Conditions
As conditional spending legislation, reforms of ESEA will
take the form of conditions within the law. Conditions explain
what a state or district must do to receive federal funding. If the
conditions for receiving funds are not met, the DOE is empowered to seek the return of the funds, although this rarely occurs.413
Conditions in ESEA must not violate the parameters for
Spending Clause legislation in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive.414 The Court struck down the law because
states were ultimately compelled to accept the Medicaid program given the large size of the program, its deep entrenchment
in the states, and the potential loss of both new and old Medicaid
funding.415 In contrast, any future reauthorization of ESEA
would condition new money on new conditions that represent
only a fraction of Medicaid funding and thus would not contravene Sebelius.416
When considering potential ESEA conditions, it is helpful to
understand that ESEA conditions currently range from merely
setting forth possibilities for states to consider to very prescriptive terms. For instance, for the fourth indicator for accountability systems, ESSA states that public schools must include “one
indicator of school quality or student success” and that this may
include such measures as “student engagement,” “educator engagement,” “student access to and completion of advanced
coursework,” “postsecondary readiness,” “school climate and
safety,” and “any other indicator the State chooses that meets
413. See MANNA, supra note 151, at 53.
414. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579–80 (2012) (plurality opinion).
415. See id. at 579–80. In both No Quick Fix and Disrupting Education Federalism, I have analyzed in greater detail why NFIB v. Sebelius provides ample
room for robust education legislation. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 225–26;
Robinson, supra note 50, at 1006–11.
416. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 226; Robinson, supra note 50, at 1009–
10.
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the requirements of this clause.”417 This condition is really an
invitation to states to decide on the additional school quality or
student success indicator that they think will be most effective.
The state plans may also include student growth if the state
deems it appropriate.418 In contrast, each state plan must include a statewide accountability system that identifies the
achievement of all students and the achievement of economically
disadvantaged, racial, ethnic, disabled, and English-learner student subgroups.419
The varying degrees of prescriptiveness in these conditions
reveal that conditions can require states to adopt a very specific
policy approach, invite states to adopt a policy approach on a
particular topic, and everything in between. Therefore, it is important to calibrate recommendations for new ESEA conditions
in light of the degree of prescriptiveness that is appropriate for
the particular policy agenda. In Sections B through E, I provide
greater detail on recommendations for potential ESEA conditions that could help to align ESEA to advance equity.
3. Meaningful Mandates
Once the United States embraces a set of principles for education that the nation believes are both effective and should
stand the test of time, those conditions should be considered for
a federal mandate through either law or regulation. Mandates
would transform an ESEA condition that has stood the test of
time into a permanent fixture on the nation’s education landscape. Given the fact that education is consistently evolving in
response to new research, federal mandates about educational
equity should only rarely be adopted. Yet, some principles can
and should be embraced for future generations and it is these
principles that could first be tested with incentives and then as
ESEA conditions, but ultimately be embraced with long-term
legislation or regulations.
One example of such legislation is Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.420 The United States no longer needs to
debate whether sex discrimination is permissible in education.
Instead, the Title IX prohibition on sex discrimination endures
417. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(v) (2016).
418. See id. § 6311(c)(4)(B)(i).
419. See id. § 6311(c)(1), (2), (4)(B)(i).
420. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901–907, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012)).
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while ESEA changes in each reauthorization. There are other
requirements for education that are essential to an excellent and
equitable education, and these requirements should not be permitted to terminate based on which way the political wind blows.
For instance, adequate and equitable funding is essential for
providing the components of an excellent and equitable education and the United States should embrace a national commitment to this critical foundation for educational equity.
4. Opposition to the No Quick Fix Approach
Undoubtedly, some will be opposed to the approach I proposed in No Quick Fix. In No Quick Fix, I analyze the costs and
benefits of my proposal and explain why an incremental approach to shifting education federalism would be superior to the
approach in No Child Left Behind that adopted an immediate
and dramatic change to education federalism.421 Here, it is worth
noting that the primary opposition to my proposal for restructuring education federalism will be the insistence that state and local control should continue to remain largely unfettered because
states and localities possess superior knowledge on what their
schools and schoolchildren need.
When it comes to equity, state action, in contrast to states’
claims, has historically shown the states to be “uninterested in
education equity” and states rarely respond to data that reveals
inequities.422 Federal leadership is essential for the United
States to move beyond the rhetorical commitment to equal opportunity that most Americans espouse to the reality of equitable and excellent schools.423 Congress must insist that educational equity remain a national priority, just as it has insisted
upon other civil rights laws in education.424
Nevertheless, state and local control would remain an essential characteristic of the U.S. education system if my model is
adopted. State and local actors would continue to decide such issues as standards, achievement goals, school design, and the
lion’s share of educational opportunities and resources. States
and localities would merely be required to distribute educational
opportunities and resources in ways that aim to meet students’
needs rather than in ways that privilege certain groups while
421. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 237–49.
422. Brown, supra note 23, at 165.
423. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN
DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10–11 (2003).
424. See supra text accompanying note 393.
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shortchanging others. The latter form of state and local control
has reigned for too long in the United States and must be replaced by state and local control that empowers but does not oppress.
In the next Sections, I consider how these three federal tools
could be used to guide reforms that help to more effectively align
ESEA to advance equity.
B. FAIR FUNDING
No Quick Fix focuses exclusively on my recommendations
that would lead states to reform school funding systems so that
they ensure equitable access to an excellent education. I briefly
summarize those recommendations here while offering some
new insights on how fair funding could be advanced through a
future ESEA reauthorization. Any conditions in ESEA on fair
funding will likely be met with considerable opposition from
states and districts. This opposition is likely given the longstanding opposition of most states to court-ordered reforms in school
finance litigation.425 Most recently, many state and local leaders
also expressed opposition when DOE considered prohibiting
spending disparities between Title I and non-Title I schools
through its supplement-not-supplant regulation.426 State opposition to funding equity occurs due to a variety of factors, including the reluctance of the states to increase or redistribute spending, the suburban domination of state legislatures, and the
erroneous belief that money does not improve educational outcomes.427
The ESSA requirement to publicly report per-pupil spending will provide parents, communities, and school districts with
new information about funding inequities. This data will breathe
additional life into the ongoing dialogue among reformers, scholars, and legislators in states about the need for greater funding
equity. However, as I explained in Part II.B.2, this additional
data alone will not be sufficient to ignite widespread funding reform.
Once public scrutiny of school funding increases, the public,
reformers, and some states should be hungry for—or at least
more receptive to—federal support that will help increase the
fairness of state funding systems.428 Federal support for fair
425.
426.
427.
428.

See RYAN, supra note 27, at 153.
See Klein, supra note 205.
See RYAN, supra note 27, at 148, 153, 172.
See Robinson, supra note 49, at 223–24 (explaining how federal grants
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funding should build state capacity for reform by offering research and technical assistance on how states can achieve fair
funding and federal grants that incentivize state adoption of innovative approaches to fair funding.429 Through research, the
federal government should publicize the lessons that states have
learned and will learn about fair funding. Technical assistance
should send federal expertise to state legislatures and departments of education to help states comprehend how to operationalize fair funding within state budgets, which must be balanced
annually. Funding incentives should encourage states to reform
the practices that research has proven lead to inequitable school
funding, including providing more funding to affluent families,
failing to link funding systems to educational goals, low funding
levels, and ineffective oversight of how funding is allocated and
utilized.430
As these reforms confirm and reshape trends in law and policymaking about the necessary elements of a fair funding system, the United States should include fair funding conditions
within ESEA.431 Given the deeply-entrenched nature of state
funding systems, I believe that conditions within ESEA on this
topic should begin with a general requirement that states
demonstrate how their funding systems fairly and equitably allocate state and local funding. This requirement should include
some specificity to ensure that states explain how they are addressing the primary shortcomings of funding systems, such as
regressive funding and low funding levels, rather than merely
inviting vague generalizations from states that their funding
systems are fair and equitable without a way to measure if fairness and equity have been achieved.432 Once the nation has seen
the impact of such a condition, Congress could design more prescriptive conditions based on the most effective reforms sparked
by federal incentives and state funding reforms, such as requiring progressive funding and a robust system of oversight and accountability for ensuring that funds are being used both efficiently and effectively.

that reward innovation could be structured to encourage ongoing state reform
of funding systems).
429. See id. at 222–23.
430. See id. at 210–20 (identifying these issues as some of the primary shortcomings of state funding systems).
431. Id. at 225–30.
432. See id. at 229.
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By moving from a general to a prescriptive set of ESEA conditions regarding fair funding, the United States could avoid the
backlash that would occur from moving from almost no conditions on fair funding to very prescriptive conditions. No Child
Left Behind provides a cautionary tale that the nation should be
slow to adopt prescriptive ESEA conditions that are untested in
the laboratories of the states, particularly for an area as important as school funding that provides the very foundation of
our nation’s education system. My incremental approach provides an opportunity to determine which ESEA conditions would
prove most fruitful and which conditions might engender unintended negative consequences.
One avenue for general and then prescriptive ESEA conditions to encourage fair funding would be to establish a separate
program within ESEA focused on this issue.433 One benefit of
this approach is that states could choose to accept or reject funding for this program while continuing to accept funding for other
ESEA programs.434 The funding for these ESEA conditions must
be sufficient to entice states to accept the funding. Once the nation is confident that the appropriate conditions for fair funding
have been identified through state experimentation, funding
conditions included within Title I provide the most likely route
to encourage widespread state buy in and reform.435
The national conversation that new funding data sparks
should increase the political feasibility of adopting grant programs that encourage fair funding as well as fair funding conditions within ESEA. Federal funding incentives also should increase public awareness of the benefits of reforms and their
feasibility. My proposals as well as those of other scholars provide an array of potential conditions that could be studied and
ultimately included within ESEA, including proposals to reform
the comparability requirement within Title I.436 For instance, education scholar Derek Black recently recommended that ESEA
433.
434.
435.
436.

See id. at 227.
See id.
See id. at 227–28.
See SABA BIREDA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUNDING EDUCATION EQUITABLY: THE “COMPARABILITY PROVISION” AND THE MOVE TO FAIR AND TRANSPARENT SCHOOL BUDGETING SYSTEMS 2 (2011); ROBERT GORDON, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, MORE EQUITY AND LESS RED TAPE: RETHINKING THE COMPARABILITY AND COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS IN TITLE I OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 3 (2008); LINDSEY LUEBCHOW, NEW AM. FOUND., EQUITABLE RESOURCES IN LOW INCOME SCHOOLS: TEACHER EQUITY AND THE FEDERAL
TITLE I COMPARABILITY REQUIREMENT 3–4 (2009).
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funds be conditioned on states weighting their funding formulas
to meet the needs of disadvantaged students while the federal
government simultaneously increases its funding from $15 billion to $45 billion.437 Congress should consider both the lessons
from federal fair funding incentives and the full array of scholarly proposals for reform that include increasing federal education funding as it develops a separate fair funding program
within ESEA or incorporates new conditions into Title I of ESEA.
Finally, the United States should consider future long-term
legislation that requires progressive funding, with an appropriate transition period for states to reform their funding systems.
This requirement would end the practice of favoring the rich over
the poor438 when poor students have greater needs,439 and would
bring the United States in line with most other developed nations that direct more funding to economically disadvantaged
children.440 Such a mandate could be embedded within a guarantee of a federal right to education, which is the right discussed
in my forthcoming book Thoughts on a Federal Right to Education,441 or adopted through legislation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.442 Furthermore, moving some reforms
from conditions within ESEA to long-term legislation could reduce the burden on ESEA to solve the nation’s education challenges. Further exploration of potential mandates on fair funding should await the insights of federal incentives and ESEA
conditions that seek to achieve this aim.
Clearly, such a legislative mandate is not politically feasible
at this time because ESSA represents a substantial reduction in
the federal role in education.443 Nevertheless, given that many
other developed countries have embraced progressive funding
and are outperforming the United States,444 the United States
437. Black, supra note 3, at 1364–65.
438. Cf. BAKER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9 (showing that seventeen states
provide less state and local funding to high-poverty districts).
439. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 40; Rothstein, supra note 169, at 61–69.
440. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REMEDIAL EDUCATION: FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICY 8 (2016).
441. KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON, THOUGHTS ON A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION (Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed., forthcoming New York University
Press 2019).
442. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 2, 5.
443. See Klein, supra note 17, at 43.
444. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., ENDANGERING PROSPERITY: A GLOBAL
VIEW OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL vii (2013); NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
SELECTED FINDINGS FROM PISA 2015, https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pisa/
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may eventually come to view this as a policy approach that benefits the entire nation. ESSA’s requirement to report per pupil
spending may make such legislation more politically feasible for
future generations. If federal incentives and ESEA conditions
prove successful, they also could prepare the nation for future
mandates on this issue.
An increase in state efforts to provide fair funding is an essential foundation for the remaining elements of my model for
institutional equity. Therefore, within the reform agenda, funding should be prioritized for federal incentives and ESEA conditions.
C. AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE TEACHERS
Teacher quality factors such as the background, preparation, experience, and certification of teachers exert significant
influence on student achievement.445 Some of the current state
approaches to evaluate teachers as well as state tenure and dismissal policies have hindered efforts to improve the quality of
teachers and student outcomes.446 However, the flaws of current
teacher evaluation, tenure, and dismissal policies demonstrate
that further research is needed on how to measure teacher quality consistently over time. Another challenge for improving the
access of disadvantaged and minority students to effective teachers is that states do not directly control hiring or placement of
teachers within districts.447 In addition, high-poverty schools often pay their teachers less than low-poverty schools. For instance, math teachers in schools with 50% or more students in
poverty earned approximately $7,000 less than teachers in
schools with 10% or less students in poverty.448
These challenges suggest that federal involvement in promoting the equitable distribution of effective teachers should
proceed in four phases. First, the U.S. Department of Education
should create a grant program that incentivizes states and districts to experiment with how teacher quality and effectiveness

pisa2015/pisa2015highlights_1.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
445. See Darling-Hammond, supra note 32, at 87–89.
446. See McGuinn, supra note 406, at 145 (citations omitted).
447. Jochim, supra note 132, at 132. One scholar has suggested that the way
to address this lack of direct control is for states to define, track and publish
data on teacher effectiveness so that local advocates can use this information to
challenge districts to distribute teachers in an equitable manner. See id.
448. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 233, at 1-28 fig. 1-11.
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can be consistently measured and reported over time and between classrooms, schools, and districts. This might include such
efforts as developing teacher report cards or numerical scores for
teachers that include an array of factors.
Second, DOE should employ grant programs to encourage
experimentation with how states and districts can ensure an equitable distribution of high-quality teachers. This phase should
include a priority for experimenting with which incentives are
effective at attracting and retaining some of the best teachers for
the students who have the greatest educational needs.449 For instance, research indicates that limited administrative support,
low salaries, and low-quality working conditions that are endemic to disadvantaged schools explain a great deal of the high
teacher turnover rates in such schools.450 Districts will be better
able to recruit and retain high-quality teachers in disadvantaged
schools when equitable funding enhances administrative support, creates competitive teacher salaries and benefits, and addresses other evidence-based factors that influence teacher recruitment and retention, such as effective training, ongoing
teacher mentoring, and impactful professional development.451
This phase should also encourage research on how teacher
tenure and dismissal policies adversely affect the equitable distribution of high-quality teachers and how unions and districts
can work together to achieve this goal.452 Attention must be paid
to ensuring the equitable distribution of teachers without creating perverse incentives for the teaching profession. For instance,
if teachers were assigned to schools without any consideration of
their preferences throughout their careers, the nation would witness a sharp decline in those entering the teaching profession.
Successful collaborations between districts and teacher unions
also should be examined.453 Some research has been conducted
449. See ANNE PODOLSKY ET AL., LEARNING POLICY INST., SOLVING THE
TEACHER SHORTAGE: HOW TO ATTRACT AND RETAIN EXCELLENT EDUCATORS v
(2016).
450. LEIB SUTCHER ET AL., LEARNING POLICY INST., A COMING CRISIS IN
TEACHING? TEACHER SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND SHORTAGES IN THE U.S. 49, 51
(2016); Brian A. Jacob, The Challenges of Staffing Urban Schools with Effective
Teachers, 17 FUTURE CHILD. 129, 142 (2007).
451. See SUTCHER, supra note 450, at 54–70.
452. See PARTEE, supra note 226, at 14 (noting some of the policies and practices that prevent getting the most effective teachers to the students who most
need them).
453. Unions can work together with school districts to improve teacher quality so that all students benefit. Montgomery County, Maryland provides one
example of a successful collaboration between a district and union to achieve
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on these issues, but additional research would be valuable if
ESEA is ultimately going to condition funds to states and districts on having effective plans for the equitable distribution of
teachers.
DOE should highlight and disseminate effective approaches
from each of these phases.454 In addition, technical assistance
from DOE for states and districts can help them achieve their
intended aims.455 Multiyear payouts should be included with
clear conditions on what is required for future payments given
the tendency of states to take federal money while avoiding the
required reforms.456 These two phases would build upon ESEA
and grant programs that seek to improve teacher quality, including the Transition to Teaching program that seeks to recruit experienced, mid-career professionals to teach in disadvantaged
schools as well as the Race to the Top District program that invited grantees to develop innovative improvements to teaching
that improve student achievement.457
Like the funding proposals noted in Part III.B, the proposed
grant programs should use discretionary funding and be modeled after the RTTT program while simultaneously avoiding
some of the pitfalls of RTTT.458 Although some districts were already experimenting with evaluating teachers based on student
achievement before RTTT, after RTTT some states repealed laws
this goal that has endured for over a decade. The district and the union adopted
a collaborative approach to improve teacher quality that includes student test
scores as a measure of student progress, embraces a peer support and review
process, and promotes a continuous improvement model for teacher quality.
Student achievement in the county has improved in all racial, ethnic, and income subgroups and achievement gaps have narrowed in all grades in math and
reading. Stan Karp, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously: A Collaborative Approach to Teacher Evaluation, 26 RETHINKING SCHOOLS 46, 48–49 (2012).
454. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 994–96.
455. See id. at 996–97.
456. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 224–25.
457. See generally Office of Innovation & Improvement, Teacher Quality,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/teacher-quality (last
visited Oct. 27, 2018). The Trump Administration’s budget proposal for FY2019
sought to eliminate the Teacher Quality Partnership program, the Supporting
Effective Educator Development Grant Program, and the Teacher and School
Leader Incentive Program. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET
SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION – PROGRAMS PROPOSED FOR ELIMINATION 51–56 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget19/
summary/19summary.pdf. However, funding for these programs remained consistent in the approved FY2019 budget. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/oveview/budget/
budget19/19action.pdf.
458. Cf. Robinson, supra note 49, at 223–24.
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that prohibited using student achievement data to evaluate
teachers; other states adopted requirements that teacher evaluation or tenure decisions include student achievement data; and,
still others used RTTT to build momentum for reforms of teacher
evaluation.459 Even though a majority of states did not enact reforms of teacher accountability,460 RTTT can still be credited
with sparking significant teacher quality reforms in numerous
states. The success of RTTT demonstrates that a large grant program can entice many states to reconsider how it evaluates
teachers. However, care should be taken to provide a broad program capable of helping most states so that the program survives the criticism of unsuccessful applicants and the Congressmen and women who represent them.461
The third phase of reform would focus on direct federal support for increasing the quality and distribution of teachers. For
this phase, I agree with the recommendation of Linda DarlingHammond and Gary Sykes that the United States should implement a “major education manpower program” modeled after federal support for training and distributing doctors to shortage areas.462 This federal program would aim to achieve three goals:
“enhancing the supply of qualified teachers targeted to highneed fields and locations;”463 “improving retention of qualified
teachers, especially in hard-to-staff schools;”464 and, “creating a
national labor market by removing interstate barriers to mobility.”465 This approach recognizes that some schools, districts, and

459. See McGuinn, supra note 406, at 146.
460. See id. at 147.
461. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 224.
462. See Linda Darling-Hammond & Gary Sykes, Wanted: A National
Teacher Supply Policy for Education: The Right Way to Meet the “Highly Qualified Teacher” Challenge, 11 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, 3 (2003).
463. To increase the supply of qualified teachers for high-needs fields and
locals, Drs. Darling-Hammond and Sykes recommend creating both a long-term
program of scholarships linked to service and loan forgiveness as well as grants
to increase the teaching capacities within cities and rural areas. See id. at 32–
33.
464. To increase retention of qualified teachers in challenging schools, Drs.
Darling-Hammond and Sykes suggest federal grants to states to create effective
teacher induction programs that are integrated into certification and licensure
requirements, research on effective strategies for improving compensation and
working conditions in challenging schools, and identifying the needed inducements to enter and remain in teaching. See id. at 34–37.
465. See id. at 32. Drs. Darling-Hammond and Sykes propose that the federal government help to reduce barriers to teacher mobility by creating common
licensing exams and interstate agreements that increases teacher mobility, sup-
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states are hampered by limited access to high-quality teachers
because of factors that are outside of their borders.466 This phase
would occur simultaneously with the first two phases.
Finally, conditions within ESEA also should be implemented in two phases. This final phase should begin with a separate program included in ESEA that provides funding to states
to adopt the approaches that have proven effective. A separate
program within ESEA will encourage states to be part of the laboratory of the states that develops effective approaches for
teacher evaluation and the equitable distribution of teachers.
Then, Title I conditions to measure and report teacher quality
and effectiveness and to ensure equitable distribution of effective
teachers should build upon the consensus that emerges from the
first two phases. These provisions must be monitored by DOE
and technical assistance must be provided to ensure that states
and districts are complying with the requirements. Without this
oversight, these conditions will remain empty rhetoric with little
to no impact on schools and students and thus will remain as
ineffectual as the current ESSA conditions. This four-step approach would provide a much stronger foundation of research
and evidence for impactful ESEA requirements on the equitable
distribution of effective teachers than the current approach in
ESSA.
D. HIGH-QUALITY PREK-12 OPPORTUNITIES TO LEARN
As I and others have previously recommended, the United
States should embrace standards that assess and publish the
state of preK-12 opportunities to learn.467 Given the lack of success of past efforts to encourage states to measure and close opportunity gaps discussed in Part II.C, how could the federal government effectively motivate states to measure and tackle the
widespread educational inequities that betray equal opportunity
and the principles of the American dream? First, any federal incentives or conditions within ESEA must be supported by a national conversation about the costs of inequitable distributions
port for a portable pension system, and investing in research on the labor market at the federal, state, and local levels. See id. at 37.
466. Id. at 3.
467. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 988–94. Others also have argued for
opportunity to learn standards. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR PROVIDING ALL STUDENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
LEARN THROUGH REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 2–3 (2010); NAT’L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN, FEDERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS 8–10 (2009).
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in educational opportunity468 and the importance of closing opportunity gaps to our democracy, economy and national security.
Only when critical national interests, such as the interest in national security, economic prosperity, and equal opportunity,
have been undermined by state transgressions has the federal
government been willing to enact broad legislation to right these
wrongs.469
Second, powerful federal incentives can entice states to
adopt opportunity to learn standards and close opportunity gaps.
These incentives should include two components. Federal support should be provided for states to experiment with the creation of opportunity to learn standards. For instance, one group
of scholars recommended that states develop “opportunity dashboards” that would enable schools to report both student inputs
and outputs.470 Support for research on measuring opportunity
will help states identify which opportunities should be measured
to help both close opportunity gaps and improve student achievement. In this phase, the way in which states measure opportunity to learn should be left to the states.
In addition, opportunity to learn conditions within ESEA
should be considered if and when state experimentation has
proven that opportunity to learn standards provide an effective
tool for guiding states in closing the opportunity gaps that cause
achievement gaps. If opportunity to learn standards have a
proven track record of success, political support for this approach
should increase, although admittedly some states will never support opportunity to learn measures because of the spotlight that
they shine on inequitable practices and their unwillingness to
remedy them.
Congress should first create a separate opportunity to learn
program in ESEA and then incorporate a condition within Title
I that requires states to adopt such standards.471 Creating a separate opportunity to learn program allows additional state experimentation before opportunity to learn standards become a
condition to receive Title I funds. Any ESEA opportunity to learn

468. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 986.
469. See Barone & DeBray, supra note 6.
470. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 42.
471. See Robinson, supra note 49, at 227–28 (discussing how federal support
for state funding reform could occur through a separate program within ESEA
or through conditions for Title I).
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conditions within Title I should include some minimum requirements on what the standards should include based upon state
experimentation with such standards.472
Most importantly, both phases of federal support for opportunity to learn standards and closing opportunity gaps must include a substantial financial contribution to the price tag for
closing opportunity gaps, just as federal fair funding incentives
must bear some of the costs of reforms. Spending more is inadequate on its own, but it will be required to expand and improve
educational opportunities, enhance their after-school and summer-school experiences, and offer the social supports that are essential for success.473 Additional federal financial assistance will
provide an essential supplement to the diverse array of state investments in education. For instance, state investments in early
childhood education vary greatly. Only fourteen states mandate
that children attend kindergarten.474 Scholars offer an array of
policy approaches for states to consider as they expand highquality early childhood education, including universal preschool
for three and four year olds,475 focusing early childhood education on low-income districts, and providing access to early childhood education on a sliding scale.476 Federal financial support
for closing opportunity gaps would indicate a firm commitment
to making educational equity a reality for prekindergarten
through secondary education.
Fortunately, this federal financial investment would not require a federal takeover of schools and districts, but rather a targeted investment that would strengthen state efforts to tackle
these challenging disparities. This federal investment would
transform the federal-state relationship into a true partnership
that would be greatly superior to both the No Child Left Behind
approach of substantial federal influence with limited investment and the ESSA approach of limited investment with little
influence.477 Collectively, these recommendations would replace

472. A mandate on opportunity to learn standards is not only politically unsustainable, but also would lack the flexibility that effective opportunity to learn
standards would need so that they could evolve with new education research.
473. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 42.
474. Id. at 29.
475. See Meredith J. Harbach, Childcare, Vulnerability and the New Parens
Patriae, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing that more states
should follow the lead of states that currently offer universal preK).
476. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 30.
477. See Robinson, supra note 50, at 1005.
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the current federalism approach with a more collaborative approach in which the federal government serves as the ultimate
guarantor of equal access to an excellent education.478
E. ECONOMIC AND RACIAL INTEGRATION
The federal government also should incentivize efforts to
promote socioeconomic and racial integration. Of the reforms
that I recommend in my model for institutional design for equity,
economic integration is in the most nascent stage. By 2016,
eighty-three school districts and eight charter schools or charter
networks sought to promote socioeconomic integration through
student assignments.479 This is a dramatic increase from 1996
when a study by the Century Foundation only found two districts
that included socioeconomic integration as a factor in student
assignment.480 Nevertheless, these efforts are still only being
made by significantly less than 1% of the nation’s approximately
13,600 public school districts that educate 50.7 million students
in 98,300 public schools, including about 6,900 charter
schools.481 In addition, racial integration has become a disfavored policy goal for many states and districts.482 A recent study
found sixty districts that are pursuing racial or socioeconomic
integration or both and that these districts enroll more than
3.5 million students.483
Efforts to pursue socioeconomic and racial integration must
rely on the other three elements of my model to be successful.
Integration is only achievable when parents may choose among
well-funded, successful schools with effective teachers that also
are socioeconomically and racially integrated. Even then, considerable effort will need to be made to convince parents of the benefits and importance of integrated school settings. Without fair
funding, effective teachers and high-quality learning opportunities, parents will forego integration to pursue these other essential components of an excellent education.
478. See id. at 1002–05.
479. THE CENTURY FOUND., THE GROWTH OF SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION
2 (2016), https://tcf.org/content/facts/the-growth-of-socioeconomic-school
-integration.
480. Id.
481. Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics (2018), NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372.
482. See RYAN, supra note 27, at 273 (explaining that more states are now
interested in academic achievement than racial and socioeconomic integration).
483. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CTR. FOR EDUC. & CIVIL RIGHTS, VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION IN U.S. SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2000-2015 3 (2017).
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The limited adoption of socioeconomic integration and the
waning support for racial integration makes my incremental approach essential for guiding federal support that promotes integration. As with the recommendation for teacher evaluations,
federal support should begin with long-term discretionary
grants to districts that support experimentation with integration. Such a grant must greatly exceed the size of the Magnet
Schools Assistance Program because that program only reaches
thirty-two grantees in sixteen states and approximately 2.5 million students.484 This new grant program will help districts and
states experiment with how to promote integration and to tailor
approaches to local conditions. For instance, research indicates
that implementing districtwide choice policies and changing attendance zone boundaries have the greatest ability to socioeconomically integrate most or all schools in a district by class.485
However, districts also use magnet and charter school admissions and transfer policies to promote integration.486
This grant program should be combined with federal research and technical assistance to grantees. It also should include federal efforts to publicize the beneficial impacts of integration. For example, the public must be made aware that
concentrated poverty depresses the achievement of children
from economically disadvantaged families, while socioeconomic
integration that maintains a strong middle class majority does
not harm the achievement of more affluent children.487 Even
with favorable research on the benefits of socioeconomic and racial integration, opposition to integration remains likely. The
federal government may be able to overcome some opposition
through concerted campaigns that highlight that integration is
an effective approach to raising student achievement and countering the adverse effects of concentrated poverty and racial isolation that harm the nation.488
A new ESEA program that promotes integration should be
included once more states and districts have experimented with
such efforts. Broader experimentation and success with grants
should provide the support needed in Congress to embrace more
484. Office of Innovation & Improvement, Magnet Schools Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/parental
-options/magnet-school-assistance-program-msap/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
485. HALLEY POTTER ET AL., A NEW WAVE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: DISTRICTS AND CHARTERS PURSUING SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY 11 (2016).
486. See id.
487. Cf. Kahlenberg, supra note 356, at 2, 5.
488. See id. at 3–4, 7.
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substantial support for integration than the Magnet Schools Assistance Program has received. Given the embryonic state of socioeconomic integration efforts and declining support for racial
integration, the United States is quite a long way off from the
political support that would be required to include promoting integration as a condition for Title I funds. Nevertheless, I agree
with those who have suggested that integration should be incorporated within Title I,489 with the caveat that an incremental
build up to its incorporation will be essential for it to be added
and retained as a Title I condition in a meaningful way.
CONCLUSION
As understanding of opportunity gaps and theirs costs increases, the American public should begin to seek solutions.490
This search must be accompanied by a shift in the national dialogue from seeking solutions for the challenges of other people’s
children to seeking solutions for all of our children.491 John
Dewey’s recognition of the importance of an excellent education
for the success of our democracy still rings true today. Undoubtedly, the state chiefs are taking an important first step toward
developing solutions to address opportunity gaps by signing on
to a commitment to equity.492 However, federal support and reform will be essential to address the limited capacity and political will of most states to make equitable access to an excellent
education a legislative and policy priority.
This Article lays bare the ways in which ESSA does not provide an effective framework to advance equity. Fortunately,
there is substantial untapped potential and authority at the federal level to support equity. Future federal incentives and ESEA
reauthorizations should restructure ESSA’s fundamentally
flawed approach to equity and instead embrace my model for institutional design to achieve equity. This approach will prove superior to ESSA because it embraces an incremental approach to
restructuring education federalism to support federal leadership
on equity. It also emphasizes a more balanced federal-state partnership that makes closing opportunity gaps an essential national objective as the United States aims to reduce achievement
489. See, e.g., Black, Leveraging Funding, supra note 60, at 244–46 (recommending that Title I should advance integration).
490. See CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 7, 11.
491. See id. at 12.
492. THE ASPEN INST. EDUC. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, supra note 8; Burnette II,
supra note 8; Klein, supra note 8.
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gaps. Improvement is challenging yet attainable with rigorous,
effective policies.493
The United States must move forward expeditiously to
achieve educational equity and excellence. We fail to do so at our
peril.

493. CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 1, at 11–13; Rothstein, supra note 169, at 70–74 (“Modest social and economic reforms that are well
within our political reach could have palpable effects on student achievement.”).

